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Golden and Its Emanations: The Surprising
Origins of Smart Growth*
JOHN R. NOLON**
I. INTRODUCTION
HOW EFFECTIVELY CAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS prevent the effects of
sprawl? Are they empowered to adopt smart growth strategies?
Can they, acting alone, create balanced and orderly land use pat-
terns? Does danger lurk in empowering local governments to act
aggressively regarding such matters, in the absence of statewide
or regional planning? These questions, despite their contempo-
rary relevance, are not new. Thirty years ago, land use practition-
ers and scholars hotly debated growth management, regionalism,
and the preemption of local land use authority.
A 1972 case decided by New York's highest court catalyzed
this national debate.' A hesitant court of appeals ceded Ramapo,
a single town in the path of metropolitan area development, au-
thority to control growth. In doing so, it set in motion three de-
cades of experimentation and creativity responsible for a plethora
of techniques now available to fight sprawl: the toolbox practition-
ers use to achieve smart growth at the local level. The court's am-
bivalence was palpable: New York's zoning regime, it said, "is
burdened by the largely antiquated notion which deigns that the
* This is a slightly abridged version of an article that originally appeared in the
Urban Lawyer. John R. Nolon, Golden and Its Emanations: The Surprising Origins of
Smart Growth, 35 URB. LAW. 15 (2003).
** John R. Nolon is Professor of Law at Pace University School of Law, Director
of its Land Use Law Center, and Visiting Professor at the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies. The author offers his sincere thanks to Kristen Kelley, his
research assistant, for her capable assistance with this article. The author also
thanks the practitioners and scholars who participated on a panel he moderated on
Local Land Use Invention at a conference entitled Revisiting Golden v. Ramapo
(1972) and Its Current Relevance, November 9, 2002 [hereinafter November Ramapo
Conference]: Jayne E. Daly, the Glynwood Center; Anna L. Georgiou, the Land Use
Law Center; Sean F. Nolon, the Land Use Law Center; Professor Thomas E. Roberts,
Wake Forest University School of Law; George Rodenhausen, Rappaport, Meyers, et
al.; and Donald W. Stever, Dewey, Ballantine, et al.
1. Golden v. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972).
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regulation of land use and development is uniquely a function of
local government . "...',2
At precisely the same time, a revolution to wrest land use con-
trol from local governments was begun. It was one fueled by the
understanding that local control of land use creates serious ineffi-
ciencies and inequities. A report entitled "The Quiet Revolution,"
prepared for the Council of Environmental Quality in 1971, con-
tained a powerful statement of the problems caused by the delega-
tion of land use control to towns, villages, boroughs, cities, and
townships: "This country is in the midst of a revolution in the way
we regulate the use of our land .... The ancient regime being
overthrown is the feudal system under which the entire pattern of
land development has been controlled by thousands of individual
local governments, each seeking to maximize its tax base and min-
imize its social problems, and caring less what happens to all the
others."3 The revolution has not succeeded, despite all the atten-
tion given to the efforts of states to create statewide, counter-re-
gimes under the rubrics of growth management, sustainable
development, and, recently, smart growth. After analyzing recent
state planning and smart growth legislation, a preeminent practi-
tioner and scholar concludes that one of the major problems in
fighting sprawl today is "the states' failure to reclaim some of
their authority delegated early on to localities in the land use field
"4
This article provides the background for the adoption of the
Ramapo ordinance, explains its precocious inventions in some de-
tail, and describes other dramatic local inventions emanating
from the Ramapo approach to smart growth. It ends with a reflec-
tion on the Quiet Revolution, the continuing disquiet that accom-
panies the spectacular smart growth inventions of local
governments in this country, and modest recommendations for re-
2. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 299.
3. FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE QUIET
REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL 1 (1972); see also Michael Allan Wolf, The Presci-
ence and Centrality of Euclid v. Ambler, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM:
PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 252, 253 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989)
(specifying the problems identified in Euclid of assigning control over land use to local
governments as "exclusion, anti-competitiveness, parochialism, and aestheticism").
To these must be added the propensity of local governments, most of which rely heav-
ily on local property taxes, to favor economic development over environmental protec-
tion. See PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 36-37, 69-75 (1995).
4. ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH 240 (ABA 1999).
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form. Along the way, the reader will encounter the rebirth of per-
formance zoning, local environmental laws that protect critical
environmental resources, a local abandoned property reclamation
act, the use of mediation to solve border wars between localities,
an intermunicipal incentive zoning program based on cooperative
annexation, and the emergence of a number of sub-regional land
use compacts among local governments.
II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF RAMAPO'S
CURRENT RELEVANCE
Professor Robert H. Freilich was Ramapo's legal advisor during
the 1960s when it was experiencing the type of rapid growth that
causes so much concern today. Like many suburban communities,
Ramapo was zoned predominantly for residential development,
mostly single-family homes. Low-density suburban zoning of this
type causes sprawl to the great consternation of local residents.5
Throughout the land, local officials struggle to change zoning ordi-
nances and master plans to absorb growth in a more creative and
responsible manner. A look at how the town of Ramapo and the
judiciary responded to growth pressures thirty years ago is
instructive.
Between 1950 and 1968, Ramapo, located in close proximity
to New York City, experienced a population growth rate of nearly
300%.6 Projections indicated that the town would double in size
again by 1985. 7 In 1969, the town board adopted a number of land
use strategies that became known as a growth management pro-
gram.5 Its inventions were sophisticated, controversial, and le-
gally dubious. Ramapo's land use devices and the courts' sanction
5. "Sprawl" is a convenient label used to describe the land use pattern achieved
by most traditional zoning ordinances and maps, particularly in outlying suburban
areas where large quantities of land are dedicated to accommodating relatively mod-
est increases in population compared to densities in established urban areas. Sprawl
is the problem that smart growth aims to solve. See Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G.
Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29 URB. LAw. 183, 184 (1997). They report that
"sprawl has engendered six major crises for America's major metropolitan regions.
These crises are: (1) central city and first and second ring suburban decline; (2) envi-
ronmental degradation through loss of wetlands, sensitive lands, and air and water
quality degradation; (3) massive gasoline energy overutilization; (4) fiscal insolvency,
infrastructure deficiencies, and taxpayer revolts; (5) devastating agricultural land
conversion; and (6) housing inaffordability." Id. at 184.
6. FREILICH, supra note 4, at 40.
7. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 295.
8. Id. at 294.
2006] 759
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of them are credited with accelerating the incipient growth man-
agement movement and setting the stage for smart growth.
In 1969, the Ramapo town board amended its zoning ordi-
nance to manage the development of land within its jurisdiction
over an eighteen-year period by coordinating that growth with the
provision of capital improvements. 9 The direct effect of these
amendments was to postpone residential subdivision in some
parts of town for as long as eighteen years. These inventions were
challenged as ultra vires, beyond the legal authority of the town,
and as a regulatory taking. The lawsuits brought by Ruth Golden,
similarly situated landowners, and the Rockland County Builders
Association were filed at a time when these issues had not been
actively litigated. 10 The 1972 opinion of the New York Court of
Appeals was nothing short of prescient. It has been sustained by
thirty years of extensive land use and regulatory takings litiga-
tion, including several recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court." The Ramapo decision has been examined and discussed
in over 100 major decisions by subsequent courts in dozens of
states 12 and evaluated in over 150 law review and journal arti-
cles.' 3 In New York, the cases that rely on Golden v. Ramapo are
among the most influential land use cases decided by its appellate
courts. 14
Ramapo's master plan amendments called for a radical
change in the rate of growth absorption experienced by the town.
The town obtained HUD funding for master planning in 1964 and
prepared a four volume study documenting the pace and effect of
growth, the inability of the town to provide needed infrastructure
to support the current rate of growth, and a host of related mat-
9. Id.
10. The U.S. Supreme Court had not been heard from on land use issues since
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S.
183 (1928).
11. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
12. See, e.g., Morgan v. Town of W. Bloomfield, 295 A.D. 2d 902, 904 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2002); Naylor v. Township of Hellam, 773 A.2d 770 (Pa. 2001).
13. See, e.g., The Hudson River Valley: A Natural Resource Threatened by Sprawl,
7 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 154 (2002); Francesca Ortiz, Biodiversity, the City, and
Sprawl, 82 B.U. L. REV. 145 (2002).
14. These cases include Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y.
1975); Charles v. Diamond, 360 N.E.2d 1295 (N.Y. 1977); Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown,
547 N.E.2d 346 (N.Y. 1989); Riegert Apartments v. Clarkstown, 441 N.E.2d 1076
(N.Y. 1982); Fred F. French Investing Corp. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y.
1976); Town of Bedford v. Mount Kisco, 306 N.E.2d 155 (N.Y. 1973); and Asian Ameri-
cans for Equality v. Koch, 527 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1988).
[Vol. 23760
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ters. 15 The planning literature of the time was full of excitement
about growth management, but there was little evidence, on the
ground, of its legal adoption. Ramapo's law preceded by several
years the passage of the much-heralded urban growth boundaries
legislation in Oregon, 16 the creation of the Adirondack Park
Agency in New York, 17 and Florida's infrastructure concurrency
law.'
As a more basic matter, Ramapo's investment in comprehen-
sive planning put it solidly on the "pro-adoption" side of a debate
emerging in the 1960s about the wisdom of adopting master plans
in the majority of states where local governments have the option
of doing so. 19 Some advocates, even today, think local master
plans unduly constrain local governments and are ineffective doc-
uments, not worth the high cost of preparation. Others believe
that land use laws that conform to objectives contained in adopted
master plans are highly successful in overcoming legal challenges.
They strongly urge communities to adopt, and regularly update,
truly comprehensive plans, backed up by detailed studies.
To implement its master plan, Ramapo adopted several
amendments to its zoning ordinance. 20 It also adopted a six-year
capital budget and a capital plan for the following twelve years
that committed the town to providing supportive infrastructure to
all parts of the community over an eighteen-year period. 21 No
changes were made in the town's zoning districts or in the land
uses allowed in each district. Instead, residential subdivision was
designated a new class of land use, called "Residential Develop-
15. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 294 (citing the application made under § 801 of the
Housing Act of 1964 (78 Stat. 769)).
16. See OR. REV. STAT. § 457 (2001). Ramapo also preceded by three years the
Ninth Circuit's affirmation of Petaluma, California's timed growth ordinance, an in-
frastructure concurrency program less intricate than Ramapo's. Constr. Indus. Ass'n
of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 934 (1976).
17. N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 800-820 (McKinney 2003). See also Wambat Realty Corp.
v. New York, 362 N.E.2d 581 (N.Y.1977); and John R. Nolon, The Erosion of Home
Rule Through the Emergence of State-Interests in Land Use Control, 10 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 497, 525-530 (1993); John R. Nolon, Development Rights and Water Body Pro-
tection: Colloqium, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 493 (1993).
18. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 163.3161 (Harrison 2002). The act defines several re-
quired and optional elements. The specific content of each element is defined in FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5 (2002).
19. Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 353 (1955); Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive
Plan, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1154 (1955).
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ment Use," and prospective subdividers were required to obtain a
special permit.22 The permit could not be issued unless a critical
mass of infrastructure was in place to serve the subdivision, in-
cluding roads, sewers, drainage, parks, and firehouses. 23 This
provision created a temporary suspension of the right to develop,
similar to the effect of a development moratorium, which has be-
come a popular technique in many states.
Several provisions of the Ramapo amendments softened the
effect of the temporary restraint on development:
" Development of unsubdivided land was not prohibited,
leaving all property owners some current land use.24
" Variances could be provided to landowners who could show
that their plans were consistent with the town's strategy. 25
" A special permit could be obtained vesting a landowner's
right to develop the parcel in the future when infrastruc-
ture is in place.26
" Developers were permitted to provide infrastructure them-
selves to qualify for a special permit.27
" A development easement acquisition commission was es-
tablished to provide property tax relief to landowners not
able to develop their parcels for several years. 28
Judge Scileppi, writing for the majority of the New York
Court of Appeals, upheld Ramapo's land use amendments as being
within the delegated authority of local governments, decided that
the eighteen-year suspension of the right to develop did not consti-
tute a regulatory taking, dismissed the town's argument that
some of the landowners' claims were not ripe, established the con-
cept that local zoning may not be exclusionary, carefully defined
the role of the courts in land use matters versus that of the state
legislature, and deferred to fact-based determinations of local
lawmakers. 29 In all these respects, the decision clearly forecast
the ensuing thirty years of land use policy and litigation. The
threads used by the Town of Ramapo and the Ramapo court to
weave the fabric of our modern land use law are as follows:
22. Id. at 293.
23. Id. at 295.
24. Id. at 296.
25. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 296.
26. FREILICH, supra note 4, at 52-53.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 53-54.
29. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 291.
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The Importance of the Comprehensive Plan: The New York
Court of Appeals recently upheld the Town of Mamaroneck's adop-
tion of a highly inventive recreational zone, limiting the use of
over 400 acres to private recreational uses as part of its carefully
planned response to growth pressures. 30 Great reliance was
placed by the court on the extensive planning and study that pre-
ceded the adoption of this novel zoning device. This is recent evi-
dence that Ramapo's reliance on its master plan was the correct
approach. The use of planned unit development zoning, not au-
thorized directly by state statutes, was sanctioned for the same
reason in Dur-Bar Realty Co. v. City of Utica.31 In California, the
comprehensive plan has been declared by the Supreme Court as a
"'constitution' for future development." 32 All California counties
and cities must adopt a comprehensive plan and all zoning ordi-
nances must be consistent with that plan.33 To be consistent, zon-
ing provisions must be "compatible with the objectives, policies,
general land uses, and programs specified in such a plan."34
Exhaustion and Ripeness: In Ramapo, the court held that cer-
tain plaintiffs who had not sought a special permit and therefore
had not exhausted their administrative remedies could bring a
constitutional challenge against the amendments. In this respect,
the court mirrors the recent holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,35 in which further applications for de-
velopment approvals were deemed unnecessary for ripeness pur-
poses when it was clear, as in Ramapo, that the local board did not
have the discretion, under the challenged ordinance, to approve
the landowner's application.
Regulatory Takings: In upholding Ramapo's temporary re-
strictions on the right to develop, the New York Court of Appeals
anticipated the U.S. Supreme Court's most recent regulatory tak-
ings decision: Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Agency. 36 In Tahoe, the Court held that a
moratorium on all development lasting thirty-two months was
30. Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. v. Town of Mamaroneck, 721 N.E.2d 971 (N.Y.
1999).
31. 394 N.Y.S.2d 913 (App. Div. 1977).
32. Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 52 Cal. 3d 531, 540
(1990).
33. Id. at 536.
34. Id. at 536.
35. 533 U.S. 606, 620 (2001).
36. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
20061 763
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not, in itself, a taking.37 The landowners argued for a categorical
rule that would classify a development moratorium as a taking
without considering the moratorium's length, the severity of the
problems addressed, or the good faith of the agency involved. 38
The Ramapo court's rationale parallels that used in the Tahoe
opinion in rejecting these arguments.39 Both indicate that prop-
erty may not be segmented in time or estate for takings purposes,
that benefits accrue to burdened property owners during morato-
ria, and that temporary suspensions of the right to develop can be
in the public interest.40
Total Takings: The measures adopted by the Town of Ramapo
to mitigate the regulation's effect on property owners (variances,
vested right permits, limited as-of-right development, self-help op-
tions, and tax relief), anticipated the U.S. Supreme Court's view
in another seminal regulatory takings case: Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council.4 1 The absence of a hardship variance provi-
sion in the South Carolina beachfront management act led the
Lucas Court to characterize a 1,000 foot setback provision, prohib-
iting all development on the plaintiffs parcels, as a total taking
requiring compensation to the landowner.42 The Ramapo soften-
ing provisions prevented the ordinance from effecting a "total tak-
ing," established by Lucas as a per se violation of the Fifth
Amendment's Taking Clause.
Affordable Housing and the Exclusion of Growth: The
Ramapo decision established the fundamental proposition that
the rights of citizens in search of a place to live are bound in the
due process rights of developers who bring actions challenging the
exclusionary effect of local zoning.43 This notion underlies the
court's subsequent decision in Berenson v. New Castle,44 holding
that local zoning must accommodate present and future housing
needs of the community and region. In the Ramapo court's words,
"What we will not countenance, then, under any guise, is commu-
nity efforts at immunization or exclusion."45 It was important to
the court that the Ramapo Plan did not attempt "to freeze popula-
37. Id.
38. Ramapo, 285 N.E. 2d at 304.
39. Id.
40. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302; Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291.
41. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
42. Id. at 1027.
43. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 300.
44. 341 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y. 1975).
45. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 301.
764 [Vol. 23
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tion at present levels but to maximize growth by the efficient use
of the land, and in so doing testify to this community's continuing
role in population assimilation."46  This is cautionary advice to
communities that attempt to use their delegated land use power to
resist, rather than to accommodate, growth.
Role of the Courts: The Ramapo majority was troubled by the
role of local governments in making decisions about growth con-
trol, and recognizing growth management as a regional, not a lo-
cal issue.4 7 The court acknowledged criticisms of local land use
control, calling the delegation of such power a largely antiquated
notion, causing distortions in metropolitan growth patterns, and
crippling efforts toward regional and statewide problem solving.48
The role of the judiciary in these matters, which has been highly
deferential in the thirty years since the decision, was precisely de-
fined by the court: "Yet, as salutary as such proposals may be, the
power to zone under current law is vested in local municipalities,
and [the courts] are constrained to resolve the issues accord-
ingly."49 The Ramapo court deferred to the local legislature's find-
ings, giving its regulations a presumption of validity, and placing
the burden of proving the invalidity of local land use legislation on
the challenger. This pattern of deference has persisted ever
since.50
46. Id. at 302.
47. Id. at 300.
48. Id. at 299.
49. Id. at 300.
50. The Ramapo court cited National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown
Township Bd. of Adjusters, 215 A.2d 597, 606-07 (Pa. 1966), referencing with favor
this comment:
In the span of years since 1926 when zoning received its judicial blessing,
the art and science of land planning has grown increasingly complex and
sophisticated. The days are fast disappearing when the judiciary can look
at a zoning ordinance and, with nearly as much confidence as a profes-
sional zoning expert, decide upon the merits of a zoning ordinance and its
contribution to the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the
community.
The Pennsylvania courts, prior to Ramapo, also sanctioned local land use invention.
This parallels a contemporary realization by the judiciary in Pennsylvania. In Cheney
v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 241 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1968), planned unit development
zoning was approved. Recognizing the predicament of local governments with respect
to land use control, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote:
It would seem that this decision is a forerunner of a necessary change in
the law of planned development. Caught between increasing population
pressure and urban sprawl and the reluctance of the rural communities
to absorb their fair share of the load, planners have been faced with an
unpleasant choice. They are now equipped with a proper instrument to
meet the challenge. The scope of this decision is by no means limited to
9
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Ultra Vires: The central issue in Ramapo was whether the
town had the power under its delegated authority to control
growth. In reviewing the history of the adoption of zoning and
land use controls, such as subdivision regulation, the court con-
cluded that municipalities have considerable room for invention,
so long as their objective is to create a balanced and well-ordered
community.51 This broad interpretation of local land use author-
ity has become a clear trend among courts nationally and has fu-
eled a great expansion of local invention to deal with the problems
of sprawl, the provision of infrastructure, the costs of develop-
ment, and, recently, the protection of natural resources and the
environment.52
Localism: Despite its deferential attitude toward legislative
bodies, the court was aggressive in pointing out the limits of local-
ism and in urging the state legislature to re-align land use respon-
sibilities.5 3 Ramapo's plan of postponing development was called
by the court "inherently suspect."54 The court noted the "serious
defects" in local control, "pronounced insularism," and the impor-
tance of "regional interdependence."5 5 It concluded with a ringing
criticism of the devolution of land use authority to localities: "Of
course, these problems [of growth] cannot be solved by Ramapo or
any single municipality, but depend upon the accommodation of
widely disparate interests for their ultimate resolution. To that
end, state-wide or regional control of planning would insure that
interests broader than that of the municipality underlie various
land use policies."56  New York's legislature, and most other
states, have left this advice virtually unheeded since 1972, elect-
ing instead to expand the extent of local control over land use mat-
ters and the techniques available to them to create balanced
communities.
Empowering Local Land Use Inventions-The Birth of Smart
Growth: Perhaps Ramapo's greatest relevance lies in its reliance
residential and ancillary usage. It can just as effectively be applied to
commercial and industrial development as well as to new combinations of
land use which are only limited by the ingenuity of the planner and
developer.
Appeal of the Township of Concord, 268 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa. 1970), referring to the New
Hope decision.
51. Ramapo, 285 N.E. 2d at 301.
52. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 302.
53. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 301.
54. Id. at 300.
55. Id. at 299-300.
56. Id. at 300.
766 [Vol. 23
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on local governments to achieve smart growth and the degree to
which it endorsed the local power of invention. Doctrinally, the
New York Court of Appeals held that the state legislature had del-
egated vast implied powers to municipalities to time growth, to
achieve the most appropriate use of the land, and to invent the
mechanisms for doing so. Pragmatically, the court left balls in two
courts: local officials were told to pick up theirs and invent land
use controls in their self interest, while the state legislature was
admonished to create regional and statewide solutions to hedge
against the risks of parochialism run amok. How the game has
been played in both venues is the subject of the remainder of this
article.
III. RAMAPO'S INVENTIONS IN DETAIL 57
The Ramapo Plan comprised not one, but ten mechanisms aimed
at growth control.58 Many of them were unknown or untested at
the time. All but one enjoyed considerable success. A description of
each follows:
Comprehensive Plan: Supported by a grant from HUD, 59 the
town conducted population projections, prepared detailed water,
sewer, and transportation studies, confirmed that the present rate
of growth was unsustainable, and articulated a policy of growth
control. This led to the adoption of a comprehensive plan that con-
tained a phased growth strategy.60
Concurrency: The Town of Ramapo's "invention" of requiring
concurrency between land development and supportive infrastruc-
ture was novel and, although not wholly new, brought the concept
57. Much of the detail contained in this section is based on statements made by
Ramapo officials at the November Ramapo Conference and interviews with these
officials before the conference. Conference and interview notes prepared by students
working for the Land Use Law Center are on file with the author. The individuals
relied on, and their positions in 1969, are John A. McAlevey, Town Supervisor;
Professor Robert H. Freilich, Town Counsel; Jack Keough, Town Zoning
Administrator; William S. Gould, Town Planning Commissioner; and Manuel S.
Emanuel, Town Planning Consultant. Notes of speeches and interviews were
prepared by law students Clara Beitin, Alex Berger, Kristen Kelley, Jessica Van Tine,
and Tiffany Eisberg.
58. TowN OF RAMAPO BUILDING ZONING AMENDMENT ORDINANCE, § 46-13.
59. FREILICH, supra note 4, at 44 (discussing § 701 of Housing Act of 1954).
60. Supervisor McAlevey stated that the secret to the success of the growth man-
agement plan was the fact that they knew the mechanisms would be challenged in
court by builders and that they anticipated litigation every step of the way. Among
the devices used to this effect was dividing the relatively short master plan into four
volumes to increase its weighty appearance. The Ramapo court, indeed, referred to
the "four volume plan" with favor.
20061 767
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to the nation's attention, largely by prevailing in the Ramapo liti-
gation. The timing of urban development was proposed as early as
1955 in Regulating the Timing of Urban Development.61 That ar-
ticle referenced emerging efforts to sequence land development in
Mountain Lakes, New Jersey, Moser Lake, Washington, and
Clarkstown, New York, adjacent to Ramapo. The Clarkstown ordi-
nance, adopted in 1955, created two special zoning districts, one
for immediate development, the other for future construction.
Most of the undeveloped areas of the town were placed in an RA-
1(x) district.6 2 The district required two acres for the construction
of a single family house but allowed residential development on
one-third acre lots by special permit when the planning board
found that the development would be served by water, sewer, and
other community facilities. 63
Special Permit Point System:64 The subdivision of land for
residential purposes was designated a special use for which a spe-
cial use permit was required.
The standards for the issuance of special permits were framed
in terms of the availability to the proposed subdivision of five es-
sential facilities or services: (1) public sanitary sewers or approved
substitutes; (2) drainage facilities; (3) improved public parks or
recreation facilities, including public schools; (4) state, county, or
town roads-major, secondary, or collector; and (5) firehouses. 65
No special permit shall issue unless the proposed residential de-
velopment has accumulated fifteen development points, to be com-
61. Henry Fagin, Regulating the Timing of Urban Development, 20 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 298 (1955). Professor Robert H. Freilich relied on the ideas in Professor
J. H. Beuscher's casebook: J.H. BEUSCHER, LAND USE CONTROLS (4th ed. 1966). Super-
visor McAlevey credits Professor Robert Anderson of Syracuse University, author of
ANDERSON'S NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE treatise, for many of the ideas em-
ployed and for credibility, "since many of us were neither national nor state-wide
experts."
62. Source documents on file with the author include the Clarkstown ordinance
and a descriptive letter by Richard May, Jr., AICP, who was planning director of
Rockland County from 1953 to 1958. Mr. May's letter indicates that the Clarkstown
ordinance was prepared by him in collaboration with Norman Williams, who served
as director of the Division of Planning and chief of the Office of Master Planning for
New York City's Department of City Planning from 1950 to 1960.
63. See CLARKSTOWN, N.Y., ZONING ORDINANCE § 4.32(F) (1955); Mel Scott, Ameri-
can City Planning Since 1890 508-09 (U. Cal. Press 1971). "This reliance on the work
of predecessors, and our subsequent reliance on Ramapo's inventions, brings to mind
the words of Sir Isaac Newton, '[I]f I have seen further it is by standing on [the shoul-
ders] of Giants."' Letter to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675).
64. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 294.
65. Id. at 295.
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puted on a sliding scale of values assigned to the specified
improvements under the statute.66
The town adopted capital budgets and plans that projected
the provision of these services and improvements over an eigh-
teen-year period, clearly demonstrating that the development re-
strictions were temporary, rather than indefinite, in duration. 67
As-of-Right Use :68 The owners of land rendered ineligible for
subdivision were allowed to develop the unsubdivided parcel as-of-
right under the current zoning, giving them some ability to utilize
their land for a limited economic use. Under this provision the
owner of a twenty-acre parcel, for example, could develop one sin-
gle family home with the right to subdivide the property for future
development when infrastructure became available. By allowing
some use of the land during the infrastructure build-out period,
this provision blunted arguments that the zoning amendments
constituted a regulatory taking.
Reduction of Tax Assessments:69 Owners who could not de-
velop their land for several years were provided a method of ob-
taining a reduction in their property tax assessment. The town
board created a seven member Development Easement Acquisi-
tion Commission, unique at the time. Landowners were en-
couraged to offer to the town what today would be called a
conservation easement or lease of development rights to the town,
restricting the owner's right to develop until infrastructure be-
came available. 70 That easement was "leased" to the town in ex-
66. Id.
67. See Toll Brothers, Inc. v. West Windsor Township, 712 A.2d 266 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1998) (holding that a local timed growth scheme was inconsistent with
the moratoria restrictions in New Jersey's Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL)). The
ordinance recognized "basic" rights and "additional" rights. A basic right is a right to
develop immediately. Additional rights could be used at some definite point in the
future depending on where the land was located. Ultimately, the ordinance was ruled
a "de facto moratorium" in violation of the MLUL, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-90 (West
2002).
68. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 294.
69. Id. at 304.
70. Conservation easements were not authorized by statute in New York until
1984 under Title 3, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 49-0301-49-0309 (McKinney 1984).
The Commission was established before the growth control amendments were
adopted to encourage landowners to postpone subdivision of their land until after pro-
tective regulations were adopted. The easement provision combined with an interim
development law, also adopted by the town board, that prohibited the issuance of
building permits in designated slow growth areas to protect the growth management
strategy from defeat before it could be officially adopted. The development easement
acquisition program was continued after the 1969 amendments as a means of treating
fairly the landowners who were subject to the phased growth provisions.
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change for annual reductions of property taxes during that period.
A five-year easement merited a 50 percent reduction in taxes and
a ten-year easement qualified the owner for a 90 percent reduc-
tion.71
Acceleration:72 A prospective developer could advance the
date of subdivision approval by agreeing to provide services and
improvements to bring the proposed plat within the number of de-
velopment points required to qualify for a special use permit.
Among the possible methods of obtaining the required fifteen ser-
vice and infrastructure points, it was most practical for developers
to provide recreation facilities and to provide for drainageways. In
one case, the developer secured four additional points for building
two little league ballfields with lighting to secure a total of fifteen.
Vested Rights:73 Developers were allowed to apply for a spe-
cial permit vesting their rights to proceed with their development
in the future when the required infrastructure and services were
in place. This provision prevented the planning board from frus-
trating developer plans for site development and density by means
of its discretionary authority. Vested rights, and development
agreements that define and protect them, have become a highly
valuable commodity in an age of increased discretion and length-
ened periods of proposal review. Scholars and practitioners are en-
gaged in efforts to secure both vested rights and developer
agreements that insulate land from changes in land use regula-
71. Ramapo appears to be the first community to use this approach, one still not
widely employed, probably because of lack of municipal awareness. Open space pro-
tection plans may be based on this invention. The Ramapo experience illustrated how
local governments may lease development rights from the owners of open lands in
exchange for a reduction in property tax assessments during the lease's term. The
landowner agrees to a limited-term lease of the land's development rights, a conserva-
tion easement is imposed on the land for that term, and during that term a reduced
tax assessment is applied, lowering the taxes that must be paid by the owner. The
Town of Perinton, in Monroe County, adopted such a program. It uses a tax assess-
ment table that establishes various percentages of tax reduction that are applied in
exchange for the town's lease of development rights. The amount of reduction in-
creases when the owner agrees to a longer lease term. A twenty-five year lease term,
for example, earns a 90% tax reduction. Penalties must be paid by owners who default
on their lease obligations. These revenues are placed in a capital reserve fund, which
is used to purchase development rights on other open lands. See Town of Perinton,
Conservation Easement Program Summary & Fact Sheet (1999); Town of Perinton,
Example of Tax Abatement on Hypothetical Property (materials on file with the
author).
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tions and provide a more predictable review and approval pro-
cess.
74
Hardship Variance :75 Another softening provision of the 1969
Ramapo amendments was a provision for issuing variances.
"Upon application to the town board, the development point re-
quirements could be varied should the board determine that such
a modification was consistent with the ongoing development
plan."76 This was used primarily to allow the owners of small par-
cels to proceed with two and three lot subdivisions, providing fur-
ther evidence of the plan's reasonableness. The town board
retained the power to issue this variance from its special permit
requirements, upon a full report by the planning board, following
a public hearing.77
Affordable Housing Program: The town board balanced the ef-
fects of growth control on affordable housing by taking direct ac-
tion to produce over 800 units of public and subsidized housing. It
created a public housing authority, cooperated with the county
government, and took advantage of HUD subsidy programs.78 Al-
though these initiatives were not mentioned in the Ramapo deci-
sion, their existence may have blunted any claim that the lack of
provision for affordable housing in the growth control areas was
exclusionary.7 9
74. Conference speaker Daniel J. Curtin recently wrote that "[olne of the most
important goals a developer must achieve is to protect its ability to complete the pro-
ject once all land use and discretionary approvals have been obtained." He further
describes a 1979 California statute establishing a development agreement procedure
to strengthen vested rights. See Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., Effectively Using Development
Agreements to Protect Land Use Entitlements: Lessons From California, 25 ZONING &
PLANNING L. REP. 33 (2002).
75. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 296.
76. Id.
77. FREILICH, supra note 4, at 53.
78. Id. at 44.
79. See, e.g., Richard May, Jr., Golden v. Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo,
APA PLANNING MAGAZINE, Sept. 1972:
The Ramapo ordinance, many may be surprised to hear, has no multi-
family districts whatsoever and the vast majority of the unincorporated
area of the township is zoned for single family lots ranging in size from
25,000 to 80,000 square feet .... Timing the development of $50,000 to
$60,000 single family homes is hardly an approach to the solution of re-
gional housing problems.
According to Supervisor McAlevey, the town's promotion of this affordable housing
subjected it to twelve lawsuits. He notes that much of the criticism of the projects was
not on the merits of the sites or the proposals but rather personal in nature and re-
lated to ethnic and religious bias. Professor Freilich notes that the capital plan placed
the existing villages in the first six years of capital improvement planning, allowing
them to be developed at greater densities where multi-family housing was allowed by
15
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Village Incorporation Law: In what became one of the salient
aspects of the Ramapo story, the town board adopted a law that
prevented the incorporation of additional villages within the town
unless the town board determined that such incorporation was in
the best interests of the town as a whole.8 0 This one technique
failed. The provision was invalidated in Marcus v. Baron, a 1982
decision of the New York Court of Appeals."' Because of the sub-
sequent formation of villages within the town, which continues to
the present day, and its effect on the success of Ramapo's growth
management plan, this topic is covered in further detail below.8 2
IV. GOLDEN EMANATIONS83
The several techniques used by the Town of Ramapo to con-
trol growth departed radically from the traditional approach to
zoning used in the 1960s, and by many communities even today,
to control local land use. Traditional zoning predetermines land
use through use of specific zoning districts, maximum densities,
lot coverage maximums, and finite building dimensions.8 4 In this
section, we examine other radical departures from the classic ap-
proach. These examples can be called Golden emanations: inven-
tions created by adventuresome local officials and sustained by
courts encouraged, we believe, by Ramapo's success. Among these
are performance zoning, incentive zoning, purchase of develop-
ment rights, and others that mimic in some form one or more of
the Ramapo suite of inventions.
A. Performance Zoning in Hyde Park
Performance zoning is a land use invention that emerged in the
late 1960s.8 5 It gained widespread attention in 1973 in Bucks
zoning. Instead of replicating villages in the unincorporated areas, the plan looked at
the town as a whole.
80. RAMAPO, N.Y., LOCAL LAW 3 (1967).
81. Marcus v. Baron, 442 N.E.2d 437 (N.Y. 1982).
82. See infra notes 146-151 and accompanying text.
83. The material in this section is drawn from the author's personal involvement
in each of the localities discussed, presentations made by panelists at the November
Ramapo Conference, and the sources cited. For an extensive treatment of the
influence of Ramapo in other states, see FREILICH, supra note 4, at ch. 4.
84. See STATE STANDARD ZONING ENABLING ACT (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
1926), 5 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
App. A (2001).
85. See LANE KENDIG, PERFORMANCE ZONING (1980); see also Alan C. Weinstein,
Performance Zoning: A Silver Anniversary Evaluation, 21 ZONING & PLANNING L. REP.
7, 53 (July-August 1998).
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County, Pennsylvania, which advocated its use by localities to pro-
vide developers more flexibility in site and building design while
protecting open space and natural resources.8 6 The model was
adopted, at least in part, by most of the communities in Bucks
County.8 7
The Bucks County model regulates development not by using
traditional dimensional and use standards but by reference to per-
formance standards that measure the impact of a development on
a particular site. 8 In Bucks County, performance zoning was lim-
ited to housing development: all types of housing were permitted
in all zoning districts and were regulated by impact measures re-
garding impervious coverage,8 9 retained open space,90 and protec-
tion of wetlands, watercourses, and other natural resources. 91
Some aspects of traditional zoning, such as zoning districts92
and certain use prescriptions, 93 were retained in the Bucks
County model. Each was governed, however, by performance stan-
dards:94 an open space ratio,95 intensity factors such as building
volume,96 transportation impacts, 97 impervious coverage, 98 and
landscaping. 99 Dense buffering was required10 0 between incom-
patible uses, and a site capacity calculation' 0 ' was used to limit
86. Performance zoning, as introduced here, is a new approach to the orderly
growth of suburban areas such as Bucks County. Rather than rely on the conven-
tional standards that dictated zoning ordinances in the past, performance zoning al-
lows any one of a variety of considerations to govern-depending on the site and how
it is designed. Performance standards deal with land use intensity measures, site
variables, design variables, and facilities. Performance zoning places the responsibil-
ity for sound design on the developer and his land planner. The test of their evalua-
tion of site capacity for various forms of development will be their ability to perform.
BUCKS COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION, PERFORMANCE ZONING 1 (1973) [hereinafter
PERFORMANCE ZONING].
87. See Weinstein, supra note 85, at 54.
88. PERFORMANCE ZONING, MODEL ORDINANCE, TECHNICAL APPENDIX (1973), Art.
V [hereinafter 1973 MODEL ORDINANCE].
89. Id. §§ 208-209.
90. Id. §§ 217-218.
91. Id. §§ 227, 505.
92. Id. Art. III.
93. 1973 MODEL ORDINANCE Art. IV.
94. PERFORMANCE ZONING, supra note 86, at 38. See also 1973 MODEL ORDINANCE,
supra note 88, Art. V.
95. 1973 MODEL ORDINANCE, supra note 88, § 218.
96. PERFORMANCE ZONING, supra note 86, at 11-14.
97. Id. at 33-36.
98. Id. at 6.
99. 1973 MODEL ORDINANCE, supra note 88, § 503.
100. Id. § 506.
101. Id. § 502.
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development impacts on each parcel and its surroundings. Traffic
impact analyses were used,10 2 density transfers were allowed to
prevent hardships, 10 3 and bonus densities were allowed to en-
courage affordable housing.10 4
Despite its promise and growing relevance in an environmen-
tally challenged society, performance zoning has not gained wide
acceptance.' 0 5 The approach is thought to be less predictable and
somewhat harder to administer than the classic use and dimen-
sion based approach. 10 6 Its principal contribution to local land use
practice has been to encourage the gradual insinuation of perform-
ance standards into traditional mechanisms such as zoning
ordinances and subdivision regulations.' 0 7 Many localities, par-
ticularly in New York, have become accustomed to administering
complex and flexible environmental reviews of their land use deci-
sions and enforcing a growing number of environmental standards
that they have adopted. These developments challenge the criti-
cisms of performance zoning as too complex and indeterminate.
The recent advent of environmental standards in local land use
may have proceeded far enough to merit a fresh look at perform-
ance zoning and its practicality.10
Such a look is being taken by the Town of Hyde Park, New
York. 10 9 A draft of its proposed performance zoning ordinance,
subdivision regulations, and performance-based community map
was discussed at the November Ramapo Conference.1-0 What fol-
lows is a brief description of the Hyde Park proposal."'
The Hyde Park approach to performance based land use regu-
lation begins with a division of the town into six areas: a green-
belt, the Hudson River waterfront, ten neighborhoods, four
102. PERFORMANCE ZONING, supra note 86, at 33-36.
103. 1973 MODEL ORDINANCE, supra note 88, § 305.
104. Id. § 508.
105. See Douglas R. Porter, Flexible Zoning: A Status Report on Performance Stan-
dards, ZONING NEWS, January 1998.
106. See Weinstein, supra note 85, at 56-57.
107. See PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR GRowTH MANAGEMENT, APA PLANNING AD-
VISORY SERVICE REP. No. 461 (Douglas R. Porter ed. 1996).
108. See generally John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local
Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365 (2002).
109. HYDE PARK, N.Y., CODE ch. 96 (Subdivision Law), ch. 108 (Zoning Law) (Draft
July 22, 2002).
110. George A. Rodenhausen, Impact Zoning in the Town of Hyde Park, available
at http://www.rapportmeyers.com/notes/details.cfmId=7.
111. The draft regulations discussed below can be obtained at www.hydeparkny.
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hamlets, a planned development district (PDD), and a town
center. 112 Within the neighborhood, hamlet, and town center dis-
tricts, core areas are established where mixed use, higher density
development is encouraged. 113 In the waterfront district, there
are five landing districts where higher density development of
water related land uses is encouraged. 114 The PDD connects the
nationally known Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt sites, a national
park, and the Culinary Institute of America. The PDD encourages
a mix of tourism-related development and open space amenities
that aspire to attract a large number of visitors, fuel the local
economy, and strengthen the tax base.11 5 Major subdivision of
land is discouraged in the waterfront and greenbelt districts. This
is the regulatory base on which the more specific performance
standards rest. This overall community design appears in, and is
taken from, the adopted comprehensive plan of the community.1 16
The organizing principle of the proposed Hyde Park zoning
ordinance is to encourage "organic growth in community centers";
in addition, the ordinance establishes three additional "strategic
directions": enhancement of community identity, economic expan-
sion, and civic cohesion. Specific purposes of the new zoning are
pedestrian orientation, orderly expansion of existing centers, in-
tegrity of Hudson River views, historic preservation, affordable
housing, and reduction of traffic congestion." 7 The zoning is cal-
culated to encourage a pattern of land use in which mixed uses
and development with higher density, scale, and intensity of use
occur in community centers supported by infrastructure and ser-
vices. "Outlying areas" are reserved for lower density, scale, and
intensity of use and for the maintenance of open space and natu-
ral resources.118 A list of land uses is permitted in various dis-






116. HYDE PARK, N.Y., COMPREHENSIVE PLAN (1997), at 3-4.
117. See http://www.hydeparkny.us/masterplan.shtml.
118. Available at http://www.hydeparkny.us/masterplan.shtml. As defined on page
thirty-nine (pdf form) of the Comprehensive Zoning Plan, "density" refers to "the rela-
tionship between the proposed use and the acreage upon which it is to be placed";
"scale" is "the total area of all uses proposed for a parcel;" and "intensity" is "a mea-
sure of the number of vehicle trips per day generated by each use." Id.
119. See http://www.hydeparkny.us/masterplan.shtml. These thirty-one uses may
be combined: the ordinance encourages mixed uses in the core areas of all districts
2006] 775
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The Hyde Park zoning ordinance proposes the use of site plan
review to achieve its four strategic objectives. 120 In neighborhood
core areas, for example, residential densities up to eight units per
acre, multifamily residences, bed and breakfast establishments,
and commercial and community uses serving the neighborhood
are encouraged. 121 Low intensity industrial uses close to the
center of the core are deemed appropriate, as are small front
yards, and common and connected open space with associated
commercial and community gathering places. 122 Buildings should
incorporate attractive bays, balconies, and porches, use tradi-
tional building forms and natural materials, and building facades
should vary, but not dramatically. 123 Design consistency along
streets is encouraged. 124
The preservation of contiguous open space is encouraged in
hamlet districts. 125 A variety of other provisions are included that
protect the environment. 1 26  Notable among them is a 500-foot
wetland buffer within which land uses are to be limited to those
that are consistent with high quality wetlands. 127 The Hyde Park
zoning draft contains guidelines for site plan review in the desig-
"provided that the scale, density, and intensity of all uses" complies with the stan-
dards established for each district. Bulk regulations are established including height,
size, lot coverage, and yards.
120. See http://www.hydeparkny.us/masterplan.shtml. Site design requirements
regulate parking, ingress and egress, separate pedestrian ways and bicycle paths,
landscaping, architectural features, storm water management, erosion control, light-
ing, and infratructure. Central water and sewer systems are required for all major
developments proposed in the neighborhood, hamlet, town center and landing dis-
tricts, including their core areas. Site standards list a variety of environmental per-
formance factors, including wetland, stream, and natural area protection. The
segmentation of any significant natural habitat or wildlife corridor is to be avoided.
Protected open space is to be contiguous with that on adjacent lots and designed as a





125. See http://www.hydeparkny.us/masterplan.shtml. In the four designated
hamlet districts, residential uses at a density of up to six units per acre are permitted
along with limited nonresidential uses. In the hamlet core area, densities of up to ten
dwelling units per acre are allowed along with more extensive commercial uses. In the
core, residential subdivision is limited to multifamily housing purposes. In the rest of
the hamlet district, subdivision of land is encouraged, as is mixed residential develop-
ment that gradually decreases density from the hamlet core areas outward to the
district's edge. Expressed in performance terms, parcels in core areas of hamlets are
limited to a maximum of 12,000 gross square feet, ten dwelling units, twenty employ-
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nated town center. 128 In the Bellefield planned development dis-
trict, immediately to the south of the town center district,
development is encouraged that promotes tourism-related busi-
nesses while complementing the Roosevelt park, library, and
homes, including a nonvehicular trail linking these sites through
an environmentally sensitive area that is to be preserved. 129 The
Bellefield PDD is to be the gateway to the town as well as a re-
gional hub serving the tourism industry. 130
The zoning map that accompanies the zoning proposals de-
picts the size and location of all these districts.' 3 ' It appears that
approximately 70 percent of the land area of the town is located in
the greenbelt and waterfront districts.1 32 A species of relief is of-
fered to landowners in these low density districts, as well as the
other districts, should they wish to exceed the scale, density, and
intensity standards. 33 The zoning draft contains a special excep-
tion permit provision. 34  Applications for this permit must
demonstrate how the proposed development conforms to the four
strategic objectives of the ordinance.1 35 Approval authority for
this special use permit is given to the Zoning Board of Appeals. 136
128. See id. In the core of the town center, performance maximums are 32,000
gross square feet, twenty-four dwelling units, fifty employment units, and 10,970
daily vehicle trips per acre. Non-residential uses in the core are encouraged that serve
the needs of local residents and the tourist trade the plan aspires to support. In this
district, only multifamily residential development is allowed. Open space standards
are aimed at creating a public realm-parks, commons, and plazas that serve as pub-
lic and private sector gathering points and amenities. All development is to be pedes-
trian friendly and designed to incorporate landscaping and building separations that
diminish the visual dominance of automobiles and stark paved spaces.
129. See http://www.hydeparkny.us/masterplan.shtml. All subdivision of land
must be consistent with a comprehensive plan and vision for the roughly 1,000 acre
district, clustering of development is required to create small centers of development,
and no more than 50% of the gross floor area of all development may consist of resi-
dences. Together, the town center and Bellefield PDD promise sensitively sited eco-
nomic development to serve the economic needs of the residents and build a
significant tax base for the community.
130. Id.
131. Available at http://www.hydeparkny.us/masterplan.shtml.
132. Id. In these two districts, the performance standards allow a maximum den-
sity of one dwelling unit per four acres, a relatively low-density development pattern
that assures a rural context for the well-defined districts and cores.
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Proposed subdivision regulations accompany the zoning pro-
posal. 137 These regulations authorize the town planning board to
use design standards created by Dutchess County under the Hud-
son River Greenway compact program, 13 directed by the Hudson
River Valley Greenway Communities Council, a state agency.
These standards are contained in an extensive document called
Greenway Connections. 139 The document is full of site-specific de-
sign standards regarding landscaping, signs, parking, and light-
ing.140 The draft regulations empower the planning board to
require that the standards in the Greenway Connections docu-
ment be followed in any proposed subdivision.
The zoning and subdivision regulations are a blend of conven-
tional and performance zoning techniques. They demonstrate that
performance zoning may be viable in communities accustomed to
approving development proposals under New York's flexible envi-
ronmental review requirements. Further, these proposals demon-
strate a new method of packaging the environmental standards
that are appearing with increasing frequency in local land use reg-
ulations. 141
The extensive performance provisions in these regulations
can be understood as environmental impact mitigation features
writ large: transferring mixed-use higher density development
137. See HYDE PARK, N.Y. CODE ch. §§ 96.2(B) through 96.8(D) draft, July 22, 2002,
available at http://www.hydeparkny.us/forms/SubdivisionLawDraft02/028.html. The
subdivision regulations strongly recommend that all land subdivision in the Green-
belt and Waterfront districts be clustered to maintain the rural appearance and envi-
ronmental resources of the town. The objective of these cluster provisions is to leave
"substantial portions" of subdivided land undeveloped. The planning board is author-
ized to mandate clustering for any particular subdivision that may have a significant
adverse impact on the community's rural landscape or its natural resources. Interest-
ingly, mixed uses are permitted, including nonresidential development. A net acreage
method of determining maximum allowable density on a particular parcel is provided
that avoids the time-consuming process of analyzing how many units would be per-
mitted under a conventional subdivision. The open space to be preserved must have a
conservation value that ensures that preserved land will serve specific ecological, rec-
reational, or agricultural purposes. To the extent that these provisions exceed the
authority localities have to permit and require clustering, the draft regulations ex-
press intent to supersede the Town Law provisions, using authority to supersede gen-
erally applicable state law under Section 10 of the Municipal Home Rule Law. See
infra note 295.
138. See infra note 295.
139. DUTCHESS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, GREENWAY
CONNECTIONS: GREENWAY COMPACT PROGRAM AND GUIDES FOR DUTCHESS COUNTY
COMMUNITIES (2000), available at http://www.dutchessny.gov.
140. Id., Greenway Guides §§ E(1)-(4).
141. Nolon, supra note 108, at 386-411.
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rights to defined cores comprising approximately one-third of the
community and greatly restricting development in designated en-
vironmental areas. The use of detailed site plan standards and of
three impact factors (density, intensity, and scale) serve the same
purpose as project-by-project environmental reviews: they miti-
gate the environmental impact of specific developments. They ac-
complish much more, however, by allowing developers in
designated districts and their cores great flexibility to mix uses,
achieve multifamily housing development, and build at greater
densities. These proposals are a contemporary example of local in-
novation in land use management that rival in our time what the
authors of the Ramapo growth management provisions achieved
thirty years ago.
B. Growth Control in Warwick
Another New York community whose level of invention rivals that
of Ramapo and Hyde Park is the Town of Warwick, in Orange
County, which is Rockland's neighbor to the northwest. In the
1990s, continuing metropolitan area population pressures made
Orange County the fastest growing county in New York. Until
then, Warwick had been beyond the pale of sprawl and spared the
task of reworking its traditional zoning ordinance. The Town of
Warwick is characterized by significant open space: highly produc-
tive farming on rich black dirt in its lowland areas, associated
dairy and other agricultural activity on its adjacent uplands, and
significant biodiversity along the Wallkill River watershed that it
occupies and regulates. A decade ago, this landscape began to be
dotted by large lot subdivisions, threatening the town's rural char-
acter and the vitality of its agricultural economy. During that ten-
year period, local leaders have been searching for methods of con-
trolling growth, as Ramapo did in the late 1960s.
In a process that is still ongoing, 142 the town and its centrally
located village, also called Warwick, are taking the following
steps: adopting compatible amendments of their comprehensive
plans, approving a town bond issue in the amount of $9.5 million
for the purchase of development rights on open land, adopting
smart growth zoning amendments that arrange development on
the land in a graduated and balanced fashion, and entering into
an intermunicipal agreement implementing a joint annexation
142. The intermunicipal agreement referred to in this section, for example, was
signed on December 19, 2002, as this article was being edited.
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and zoning policy. 143 This compact between the municipalities is
designed to incorporate town lands into the Village of Warwick
through annexation. It provides for preliminary site plan review
prior to annexation, the use of floating zoning, incentive zoning,
and annexation credits to govern the award of higher densities to
town land that is incorporated into the village and its water and
sewer districts. 144 The agreement also establishes a trust fund
into which developers of annexed land will deposit payments for
the additional density afforded their lands. 145 These funds will be
shared by the village and the town to carry out their comprehen-
sive planning objectives. 146 Here is how each of these techniques
work:
Comprehensive Plans: Although encouraged by state law to do
so, 14 7 local governments seldom refer to neighboring communities'
comprehensive plans or land use policies in drafting their own. In
August 1999, the town adopted The Town of Warwick Comprehen-
sive Plan establishing a goal of protecting agriculture and open
space and adopting a strategic principle of steering new develop-
ment toward the Village of Warwick through a "density transfer
program."14 The plan notes that this program accommodates
both preservation and development interests and is designed to
maintain value in lands designated for protection while promoting
development that is compact, orderly, and efficient. 1 49 This policy
is guided, in other words, by smart growth principles. The village,
in turn, prepared a draft comprehensive plan that supports the
town's policy of open space and agricultural land preservation and
pledges its cooperation with the town's density transfer pro-
gram. 150 An interesting fact contained in the town's plan is that
operating farms in Warwick require from 25 to 61 cents in munici-
pal services for each dollar of taxes they pay; in contrast residen-
143. Anna L. Georgiou, The Importance of Local Invention Village and Town of
Warwick, Orange County, New York, presentation at the November Ramapo Confer-




147. Georgiou Presentation, supra note 143; see N.Y. Town LAW § 272-a (McKin-
ney 2002), which states that the "town comprehensive plan may include ... considera-
tion of regional needs and the official plans of other government units and agencies
within the region."; see also N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-722(b) (McKinney 2002).
148. Id.
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tial subdivisions require from $1.05 to $1.08 in services for each
tax dollar they generate.15 '
Purchase of Development Rights: The town's comprehensive
plan also recommends that a Purchase of Development Rights
(PDR) program be instituted in the town as soon as possible. 15 2
Based on a study prepared by the Land Use Law Center, the town
board began a campaign to float a bond issue in the amount of
$9.5 million for the purchase of development rights on open land,
principally agricultural parcels. 153 In November 2000, the voters
of the town and its three constituent villages narrowly approved
the issuance of bonds in this amount for the purpose of purchasing
development rights on agricultural lands in the town and the ac-
quisition of open space resources in the villages. A dispute that
erupted over this referendum and the importance of its resolution
is discussed below.
Smart Growth Zoning Amendments: In January 2002, the
town board unanimously adopted a sweeping change of local zon-
ing to achieve the objectives of its comprehensive plan.154 These
zoning amendments create several zoning districts, including
floating and overlay zones, and adopt other techniques that pro-
vide for the arrangement of development on the land in a gradu-
ated and balanced fashion. The amendments include a traditional
neighborhood overlay district designed to promote higher density,
mixed use development in the town's hamlets, very low density
and clustering in a rural district, medium density in a suburban
residential district. 155 The amendments also created a senior
housing floating district and several discrete environmental pro-
tection provisions, including a conservation district to protect des-
ignated environmentally sensitive areas, a ridgeline overlay
district, a land conservation district, and two agricultural land
protection districts.1 56
Intermunicipal Agreement Regarding Annexation and Zoning
Policy: The town and the village have drafted an intermunicipal
agreement designed to incorporate town lands into the Village of
151. Cost of Community Services, Cornell University's Local Government Program.
152. Town of Warwick, N.Y., Comprehensive Plan, at 45 (Aug. 19, 1999), available
at http://warwick.hvnet.com/pdP/Chapt3.pdf.
153. Jeff LeJava, Open Lands Acquisition: Local Financing Techniques Under New
York State Law, Technical Paper Series, No. 2 (M.C.A. March, 2000).
154. Georgiou Presentation, supra note 143 (WARWICK, N.Y., TOWN CODE art. III, §
164-30).
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Warwick and its water and sewer districts in a way that provides
financial resources to the village and town to accomplish their
comprehensive plan objectives. In recent years, the village has an-
nexed lands under General Municipal Law, Article 17.157 Each
time it did, it automatically provided that the annexed lands
would be zoned to permit three units of housing per annexed acre,
increasing allowable density ninefold over the three-acre mini-
mum lot size provided under town zoning. This provided annexed
landowners and developers a windfall density increase. Under the
intermunicipal agreement, the village will annex land in coopera-
tion with the town and zone annexed land at the same density
provided under the applicable town zoning. 158 In much of the area
around the village, town zoning allows the construction of single-
family homes on three-acre lots.
Using a combination of floating and incentive zoning, the vil-
lage will create an Annexation District Zone that allows its plan-
ning board to approve up to three units per annexed acre-a
significant density bonus. 15 9 To qualify, the annexed owner must
submit a preliminary proposal for the higher density development
157. See § 703, which states the intention of the legislature to allow annexation of
territory from one local government to another and establishes as prerequisites to
annexation the consent of the people in the land annexed and the consent of the local
government whose land is to be annexed upon the basis of its determination that the
annexation is in the over-all public interest. This section provides, where this consent
is withheld, for adjudication in the Supreme Court of the issue of whether the annexa-
tion is in the overall public interest. See Trustees of Village of Warwick v. Bd. of Town
of Warwick, 56 A.D.2d 928 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), where an owner of a 144-acre parcel
who could not develop multifamily housing in the Town of Warwick because of the
lack of required water and sewer systems requested that his land be annexed into the
village, which had both. The village proposed the annexation, the town failed to con-
sent, and the Supreme Court referee recommended it. The Second Department af-
firmed the referee's report holding that the proposed annexation was in the overall
public interest. The court noted that the test was "whether or not the annexing local
government and the territory to be annexed have the requisite unity of purpose and
facilities to constitute a community. The court concluded the proposed annexation
met that standard. See also Trustees of Village of Warwick v. Bd. of Town of Warwick,
244 A.D.2d 332 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), in which the village sought to annex a parcel of
land from the town that was to be developed as a shopping center for the purpose of
enhancing the village's tax base. The Supreme Court referee's report concluded that
annexation was in the overall public interest. The court affirmed the report by weigh-
ing the benefit against the detriment to the annexing municipality, to the territory
proposed to be annexed, and to the governmental units from which the territory
would be taken. The court observed that the town lacked plans to develop the prop-
erty and could not provide the needed services if such a proposal existed. Further, the
village would benefit from the revenue generated and jobs created.
158. Georgiou Presentation, supra note 143.
159. Id. (N.Y. GEN. CiTY LAW § 20-g(l) (McKinney 2000) ("By the enactment of [§
20-g] the legislature seeks to promote intergovernmental cooperation that could re-
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol23/iss3/7
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to the village's planning board, prior to annexation, and have it
approved conceptually. 160 The agreement provides for both the
town board and the village council to approve the annexation
before it occurs. 161 Following annexation, the floating incentive
zone can be affixed to the annexed land by an amendment of the
zoning map, allowing the landowner to develop up to three units
per acre. 162
Using average figures, under the town's zoning as adopted by
the village, a 100-acre parcel annexed by the village might yield
25 building lots, with deductions for roads and infrastructure and
environmental mitigation conditions. After the application of the
village's floating incentive zone to the land, the same 100-acre
parcel might yield 150 lots, accounting for the same deductions
and a planning board decision to allow half-acre, rather than one-
third acre, lots to protect the adjacent areas. This new zoning in-
creases the parcel's yield by 125 lots (150-25). Under New York's
incentive zoning law, the developer can be required to pay a fee for
this density bonus with the funds deposited into a trust fund for
specific public benefits that will be secured by the incentive
awarded. 163 If this fee is established at $50,000 per unit, a fairly
modest cost for land in the area, the trust fund contribution by the
developer of this 100-acre parcel would be $6,250,000. The agree-
ment provides that all of the fund proceeds will be dedicated to the
purchase of development rights on lands in the town.
C. Mediation of Land Use Disputes 164
This creative compact between the village and town and the
town's Purchase of Development Rights (PDR) program were
threatened by a dispute that occurred shortly after the voters ap-
proved the bond issue to raise $9.5 million for open space develop-
ment rights acquisition. The Town of Warwick has three villages
sult in increased coordination and effectiveness of comprehensive planning and land
use regulation..."); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7- 741(1) (McKinney 1996)).
160. Georgiou Presentation, supra note 143.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (N.Y. TowN LAW § 261-b (McKinney 2000)).
164. The material in this section is based on a report by Sean F. Nolon, director of
mediation for the Land Use Law Center, who mediated the dispute between the Town
of Warwick and its three villages described here, and on his presentation on the
matter at the November Ramapo conference (on file at the Land Use Law Center).
The consensus reached by representatives of the four municipalities, through this
mediation, is described in the GREENWOOD LAKE AND WEST MILFORD NEWS, July 18,
2001, Vol. 40, No. 10, at 1 (on file at Land Use Law Center).
7832006]
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within its borders: Greenwood Lake, Florida, and Warwick. Citi-
zens of the villages campaigned actively against the PDR bond
proposition and threatened litigation to stop it after the referen-
dum passed. The Anti-PDR Coalition was formed prior to the No-
vember referendum and led a vigorous assault against the
proposition.
Before the November 2000 election, the town stressed that
the PDR program would prevent sprawling development and re-
duce taxes in the long run. Its campaign literature explained that
every time a new home is built within the town, the addition of
students into the school system causes a deficit in the school
budget. 165 By reducing the number of new homes through the
PDR program, the town argued that PDR would prevent an in-
crease in school taxes. The campaign material also explained the
virtues of retaining the town's rural character and sense of
openness.
The villages responded with their concerns. Greenwood Lake,
for example, observed that it is not in the Town of Warwick's
school district and would not benefit from the purported school tax
savings achieved by PDR. In addition, since it is physically sepa-
rated from the town by Tuxedo Mountain, its citizens reap few of
the scenic and character enhancing rewards of preserving open
lands in the town. All of the villages complained that the amount
of funds to be spent in the villages themselves was significantly
less than the sums to be derived from village taxpayers. The vil-
lages also claimed that the PDR program would cause a shift in
development to the villages, which would stress their budgets and
cause more traffic congestion. The local newspaper in the Village
of Greenwood Lake published lead editorials urging the public to
vote against the bond resolution; a local website was established
as a clearinghouse for those opposed. 166
After the passage of the bond act, the villages of Greenwood
Lake and Florida consulted with the state attorney general and
state comptroller to see if they could opt out of the PDR program.
In addition, the villages began campaigning against the entire ag-
ricultural preservation effort. They encouraged opposition to town
preservation plans, voiced objections at town meetings, and urged
county and state officials not to support the town's efforts. After
the unsuccessful attempt by the town to negotiate a deal with
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Greenwood Lake for the purchase of village property, a regional
mediation program was invited to help resolve the dispute.167
For five months, the mediators worked with a group of seven-
teen representatives from the town and the three villages to seek
a mutually acceptable outcome. An agreement was reached that
met the interests of the villages through a formula that returns a
pro-rata portion of the land acquisition funds to those jurisdic-
tions. In return for this agreement, the villages pledged to support
fully the town's agricultural preservation initiative and to assist
efforts to raise funds from county, state, and federal sources. The
settlement also contained an agreement to work toward the con-
solidation of school districts.
The Warwick example builds on another legacy of the local
officials and professionals responsible for the Ramapo growth con-
trol ordinance. One of their critical objectives was to build wide-
spread community support for the novel approach to smart growth
by taking time to involve the public, hear all sides, flesh out all
interests, and incorporate them in the final ordinance. 168 This ap-
proach to citizen participation and stakeholder involvement in
land use decision-making has also been endorsed by New York's
highest court. The New York Court of Appeals sanctioned infor-
mal multi-party negotiations during the early stages of the local
development review and approval process in Merson v. Mc-
Nally.169 The issue in that case was whether a project that, as
originally proposed, involved several potentially large environ-
mental impacts, could be mitigated through project changes nego-
tiated in the early environmental review process mandated by the
state Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) process. 170
The agency involved in the Merson case was the planning
board in the Town of Philipstown.1 71 The owner of a mining site
167. The Land Use Law Center, supported with funds from the Hewlett Founda-
tion, created a process for the assessment and resolution of land use disputes. The
mediation program identifies and trains local leaders from other communities who
have experience in local land use matters, and assigns them to work with Center staff
in the resolution of disputes of this type.
168. This strategy was forcefully summarized by both Supervisor McAlevey and
Professor Freilich, special counsel, in their presentations at the November Ramapo
Conference.
169. Merson v. McNally, 688 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1997).
170. See Merson, 688 N.E.2d at 481; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, §
617 (2002).
171. Merson, 688 N.E.2d at 483. Mediation has been gaining popularity for resolu-
tion of land use disputes for some time. See SUSAN L. CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY,
MANAGING PUBLIC DISPUTES (Jossey-Bass Publishers 1988). Private parties are free to
2006] 785
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submitted a full environmental assessment form as required by
SEQRA along with its application to the board for a special permit
to conduct expanded mining operations. 172 In an unusual move,
the planning board conducted a series of open meetings with the
project sponsor, other involved agencies, and the public. 173 As a
direct result of the input received at these meetings, the applicant
revised the project to avoid any significant negative impacts. 74
The planning board then issued a negative declaration, finding
that the project, as now configured, would not negatively affect
the environment. 75 This avoided months of delay and many
thousands of dollars in further project reviews for the applicant.
The court of appeals found that the planning board had con-
ducted an "open and deliberative process" characterized by signifi-
cant "give and take.' 76 It described the planning board's actions
as "an open process that also involved other interested agencies
and the public" rather than "a bilateral negotiation between a de-
veloper and lead agency." 177 It found that the changes made in
resolve a dispute as they wish (within the law), but such freedom is not clearly appli-
cable to public entities, which may only act within their statutory authority. Perhaps
this explains the growing number of statutes that expressly authorize mediation of
land use disputes. At least twelve states offer some type of mediation or dispute reso-
lution services (as opposed to merely authorizing mediation) in the land use context:
Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Utah, Vermont, and Washington.
172. Merson, 688 N.E.2d at 482; see CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 171. When
a landowner submits an application for a development permit to a local land use
agency, an extended process of negotiation is initiated. The parties to this negotiation
are the owner, the members of the local administrative agency with approval author-
ity, other involved public agencies, and those affected by the proposed project: neigh-
bors, taxpayers, and citizens of the community. Unlike commercial and personal
negotiations, this process is not viewed by most of its participants as a negotiation in
the traditional sense. Local zoning ordinances give the landowner property rights that
must be respected. State and local statutes prescribe standards and procedures that
the agency members must follow. Affected neighbors and citizens receive notice of
their right to attend and speak at one or more public hearings. This process is not
organized, in most localities, as it could be, as a structured negotiation in which the
parties meet face-to-face, follow a self-determined process of decision-making, and ar-
rive at a mutually acceptable agreement based on facts gathered in the process and
give-and-take on all sides. The significance of the Merson case is that it endorses the
use of effective negotiating strategies by the parties appearing before a land use re-
view agency to achieve the kind of much touted, win-win results available in private
negotiations. It also demonstrates the creative way that review board chairs can initi-
ate and effectively use this type of negotiating strategy.
173. Merson, 688 N.E.2d at 482.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 485; CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 171, at 753.
177. Merson, 688 N.E.2d at 485.
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol23/iss3/7
ORIGINS OF SMART GROWTH
the proposal were not the result of conditions imposed by the plan-
ning board but were, instead, "adjustments incorporated by the
project sponsor to mitigate the concerns identified by the public
and the reviewing agencies .... "178 In short, the planning board
had created an effective multi-party negotiating process that met
due process requirements. 179
D. Aquifer Protection in Dover
A bruising conflict between the Town of Dover, in Dutchess
County, in the northern New York metropolitan area, the state
Department of Environmental Conservation, and the mining and
solid waste disposal industry illustrates a more focused use of the
legacy of Golden v. Ramapo.180 Dover is located to the north of the
vast New York City watershed, which was subject to prohibitive
regulations imposed by the city's Department of Environmental
Protection, operating as the delegate of the state Department of
Health under New York law. These regulations were designed to
protect the city's water and to avoid an EPA order to filter its
water at a cost of billions of dollars.1sl The direct effect of these
regulations was to drive heavy industries, mining, and deposition
businesses to seek facilities just beyond the city's watershed. The
inadvertent result was a spate of applications to the Town of Do-
ver for such activities. This all took place during the period be-
tween the adoption of the comprehensive plan and of the
implementing regulations discussed here. Given the DEC's rela-
tive indifference to the occurrence, the town was forced to take
action on its own.
In April 1999, an eight year old confrontation ended with
amendments of Dover's traditional zoning ordinance to create four
overlay districts. They were: (1) a Floodplain Overlay District cov-
ering FEMA-defined 100-year floodplains in streams and rivers;
(2) a Stream Corridor Overlay District covering land within 150
feet of the mean high-water line of the Ten Mile River, Swamp
River, and other streams; (3) an Aquifer Overlay District covering
178. Id. at 486.
179. See id.
180. See Jayne E. Daly, What's Really Needed to Effectuate Resource Protection in
Communities, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 189 (2002), and her presentation at the Novem-
ber Ramapo Conference.
181. These regulations became effective on May 1, 1997. They were issued by the
city under N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 1100(1) (McKinney 1997). As a direct result, New
York City has complied with the 1986 Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(f)-
(j)(26) (1997), and the 1989 Surface Water Treatment Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 141.71 (1997).
20061 787
31
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Dover's valley bottom aquifer system as well as the upland aquifer
system; and (4) a Mixed Use Institutional Conversion Overlay
District covering the former Harlem Valley Psychiatric Center. 182
The amendments also prohibited a variety of nuisance-type activi-
ties, several of which were specifically permitted by state regula-
tions and endorsed by the DEC. These include heavy industry, soil
mining, underground mining, asphalt plants, blasting and rock
crushing facilities, hazardous waste and radioactive material dis-
posal facilities, all classes of solid waste management facilities not
owned or operated by the Town of Dover, and the use of certain
reclamation material. The adoption of this highly sophisticated
suite of provisions is significant because it was done by local offi-
cials in a relatively remote part of the metropolitan area, indicat-
ing that inventions like Ramapo's are diffusing into areas not
known for their sophistication in land use affairs.
Dover's effort began in 1991 with the formation of its master
plan committee, a broadly representative group including mem-
bers of local boards and citizen interest groups.18 3 Studies for the
plan, which was adopted in 1993, documented the need to protect
defined natural resources and detailed the dangers created by
mining, quarrying, and heavy industries, particularly over the
town's sole-source drinking water aquifer.18 4 The plan called for
the use of thoughtful and innovative planning strategies including
clustering, performance standards, storm water infiltration poli-
cies, aquifer protection zones, conservation easements, erosion
control plans, and development density limits based on ground-
water features. 185 Shortly after the plan's adoption, a developer
proposed using a 100-acre existing mine for the deposition of up to
27,000 tons of construction and demolition (C&D) debris.' 8 6 The
parcel, located in a medium-density residential district, contained
an existing mine, which was a preexisting nonconforming use
under local zoning.'8 7
Under New York law, C&D deposition operations are regu-
lated by state standards; operators are required to obtain a permit
from the DEC.' 88 The mining company submitted an application
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to the DEC in 1993.189 The DEC, in turn, assumed the lead role
under New York's aggressive environmental review statute, leav-
ing the town in the less powerful position of an involved agency. In
an unusual move, the applicant received a letter from the local
Zoning Board of Appeals stating that its members believed that no
local approval was needed under local zoning because the uses
proposed were accessory to nonconforming uses. 190 Letters of this
kind, issued at the behest of a private party, are not only unusual
but most likely beyond the authority of the zoning board. In re-
sponse, the chief elected official of the town sent a letter to the
DEC stating that the town board disagreed with the ZBA on this
interpretation. 19 The DEC determined that the site was not lo-
cated over a principal or sole source aquifer, a conclusion hotly
contested by the town.' 92 The experience convinced the town that
it was ill prepared to protect itself from the adverse environmen-
tal and economic effects of this and similar proposals and that the
DEC was not charged with protecting the same interests as those
delegated to the town under its zoning and land use authority.
In May 1998, the town began preparation of a new zoning
code to implement the proposals in the master plan.193 It also
determined that the C&D operation needed several local approv-
als under existing regulations. 94 When the DEC determined in
1998 that the project required a new permit under its own regula-
tions, the operator initiated applications for town and DEC ap-
provals. 95 During required hearings on these matters, the town
adopted its new zoning, which prohibited the proposed uses.' 96 In
Danny Fortune Co. v. Town of Dover,'97 Dover's zoning amend-
ments were upheld against the applicant's claim that they were
adopted in violation of state environmental review requirements
and because of representations made by the ZBA and others, the
town was prevented from denying its use under the doctrine of
equitable estoppel.
Today, the town's aquifer is protected by its own zoning over-









197. Danny Fortune Co. v. Town of Dover, No. 99-4052 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
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DEC. The Dover story is an interesting example of local govern-
ment wresting control of the development permitting process from
a state agency and substituting local standards for state stan-
dards, in the interest of protecting an environmental asset of great
importance to the locality and its citizens. This struggle between
one town and one state agency illuminates the larger conceptual
battle between advocates of state versus local control of land use
regulation.
E. Rescue of Contaminated Property in Sleepy Hollow 198
In a remarkable display of legal creativity, the village council of
Sleepy Hollow, in Westchester County, across the Hudson River
from Ramapo, adopted the Abandoned Industrial Property Recla-
mation Law. 199 The purpose of the law is to prevent the creation
of nuisance conditions, hazards to public safety, and industrial
blight, and to assure that large industrial properties are evalu-
ated for environmental degradation and that environmental con-
tamination is remediated prior to a significant change in use of an
industrial facility.20 0 This local environmental law applied to any
industrial property owner with more than 50,000 square feet of
manufacturing space seeking to terminate onsite operations. 20 1 It
required the owner to demolish all structures and to clean up the
site within eighteen months of termination of operations. 20 2
In fact, the law was designed to give the tiny village on the
Hudson leverage against a corporate giant, General Motors, at a
time when it announced plans to abandon a century-old automo-
bile manufacturing plant on a prime riverfront site.203 A survey of
abandoned industrial plants done by the village disclosed that few
198. See generally Donald W. Stever, From Assembly Line to Sidewalk Cafd:
Turning an Automobile Assembly Plant into a New Town in Sleepy Hollow, New York,
20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 177 (2002), and his panel presentation at the November
Ramapo Conference.
199. SLEEPY HOLLOW, N.Y., CODE ch. 17A: Environmental Protection and Aban-
doned Industrial Property Reclamation (1993). In Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of
Lodi, the court held that a local environmental clean-up law was not preempted by
CERCLA or a comparable California state statute. 41 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1104 (E.D.
Cal. 1999).
200. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 271 F.3d 911, n.11 (9th Cir. 2001).
201. SLEEPY HOLLOW, N.Y. CODE ch. 17A.
202. Id.
203. Car production began in Sleepy Hollow before the turn of the last century. The
Maxwell-Briscoe Motor Car Company had its headquarters there and established op-
erations on a floodplain below a bluff just north of Beekman Avenue, the main com-
mercial street in the village. From the site, one has a westerly view across the Hudson
of the scenic Palisades, which are just to the east of Ramapo. The automobile com-
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were redeveloped, some were Superfund sites, and that it took
years to achieve redevelopment of the few that were successes.
The prognosis for the GM site, like most similar sites, was decades
of waste and disuse causing a blight on the riverfront, a drain on
the village tax base, and a brake on the community's vision.
In 1996, GM announced the closing of its Sleepy Hollow
plant.20 4 It then filed suit against the village in federal district
court claiming that the Abandoned Industrial Property Law vio-
lated its constitutional rights.20 5 The parties immediately entered
into negotiations in settlement. 20 6 They were successful in achiev-
ing an agreement that committed GM to remediation, demolition,
the design of a master plan for the redevelopment of the site, steps
for its implementation, the donation of a significant waterfront
parcel to the village, a schedule for all these activities, and the
grant of an option to purchase to the village if the schedule is not
followed. 20 7
The adoption of the abandoned property law was part of a
Ramapo-type, multi-step planning and land use program for the
village of the type created in Ramapo:
" Its Conservation Advisory Council, beginning in 1990, de-
veloped a Local Waterfront Revitalization Plan, with fund-
ing and technical assistance from the New York
Department of State, under its version of the Coastal Zone
Management Program. 20 8
* In 1997, the village council adopted the Local Waterfront
Revitalization Plan (LWRP). 20 9 It required that the GM
site development be designed to conform to its plans for the
Beekmen Avenue Corridor.210
* The LWRP called for a Riverfront Development zoning dis-
trict to be established.2 11 The village council, in turn,
pany was subsequently bought by the Chevrolet Motor Car Company, which was later
acquired by General Motors.
204. See Stever, supra note 198.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See supra note 84 regarding the use of negotiation and mediation in land use
disputes.
208. Optional Local Government Waterfront Revitalization Program for Coastal
Areas and Inland Waterways, N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 915 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1996).
Sleepy Hollow is on the Hudson River, a tidal estuary, and this shoreline is consid-
ered to be coastal, qualifying Sleepy Hollow for assistance in developing an LWRP.
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adopted the RD zone that required redevelopment of the
property as a planned unit, carefully fitted into a tradi-
tional riverfront village with mixed commercial and resi-
dential uses. 212
* In 1998, GM began demolition, which was completed in
eighteen months.213
" In 1999 through the present, countless workshops and open
public meetings have been held with local boards and re-
sidents on the design and reuse of the site.
" In 2001, GM, in consultation with the village, chose the
Roseland Property Corporation as the redeveloper. 214
" In January 2002, GM, the village, and Roseland held a pub-
lic meeting in village hall to announce the plans for the re-
development of the site including the creation of a park
linked to adjacent parks and green space to create a signifi-
cant environmental buffer to the site.215
F. State Laws that Enable Local Land Use Inventions
Local governments derive their authority to enact laws that pro-
mote smart growth from state-adopted land use enabling statutes,
home rule laws, and laws that promote a variety of special state
and local interests. 216 The understanding that emerges from this
review is that many states have empowered local governments to
adopt flexible laws to balance land use patterns and protect their
natural resources from the adverse impacts of land use. These il-
lustrate how, from state to state, localities like Ramapo, Hyde
Park, Warwick, Dover, and Sleepy Hollow are empowered to cre-
ate innovative smart growth strategies.
In most states, it is understood that municipalities have no
inherent powers, but can exercise only that authority expressly
granted or necessarily implied from, or incident to, the powers ex-
pressly granted by the state. Unless the language delegating the
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See Stever, supra note 198.
215. These plans are supported by Historic Hudson Valley and Scenic Hudson, re-
gional nonprofits charged with guarding the Hudson River's cultural and environ-
mental assets. Both organizations were involved in and shaped the village's plans and
redevelopment notions.
216. This range of authority is illustrated here by references to statutes in North
Carolina, Georgia, South Carolina, Colorado, and New York. Constitutional provi-
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power is unambiguous or the legislature's intent to delegate cer-
tain powers is clear, doubts are generally resolved against the mu-
nicipality. 217 Courts vary from state to state as to how strictly
they construe express delegations of power to municipalities.
Some find a broader range of implied or incidental powers within
the express language used; others do not.
In North Carolina, the state legislature adopted a legislative
rule of broad construction of powers delegated to local govern-
ments. 218 Prior to that time, the courts had applied Dillon's Rule,
strictly construing specific grants of authority to local govern-
ments.21 9 A Raleigh, North Carolina requirement that a devel-
oper creates open space in a subdivision and conveys title to it to a
private homeowners' association was upheld using the legislative
rule of broad construction. 220 The reach of this rule was evident in
Homebuilders Ass'n v. City of Charlotte,221 in which the power to
impose user fees on applicants for rezoning, special use permits,
plat approvals, and building inspections was upheld in the ab-
sence of expressly delegated authority. How far the North Caro-
lina courts will go in upholding local land use inventions under
this rule is not known. It has been argued, however, that the
state's zoning enabling statute, which allows localities "to regulate
'the percentage of lots that may be occupied, the size of yards,
courts and other open spaces [,I' provides authority to require buff-
ers along waterways, to protect important natural areas, and to
217. The classic statement of this view, adopted by the courts of many states, is
found in JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1872):
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corpo-
ration possesses, and can exercise, the following powers, and no others:
First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly
implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted; third, those es-
sential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not sim-
ply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning
the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation,
and the power is denied .... All acts beyond the scope of the powers
granted are void.
Id. at 101-02. This rule is commonly known as Dillon's Rule.
218. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-4 (1999) (stating that "[i]t is the policy of the General
Assembly that the cities of this State should have adequate authority to execute the
powers, duties, privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law. To this end,
the provisions of this Chapter and of city charters shall be broadly construed and
grants of power shall be construed to include any additional and supplementary pow-
ers that are reasonably necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and effect
219. See supra note 217.
220. River Birch Ass'n v. City of Raleigh, 388 S.E.2d 538, 542-44 (N.C. 1990).
221. Homebuilders Ass'n v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45 (N.C. 1994).
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set requirements that authorize or even mandate clustered devel-
opment schemes." 222
Georgia follows Dillon's Rule. It is regarded as a strict con-
structionist state where local governments have only those powers
expressly granted and any reasonable doubt about their authority
is resolved in the negative.223 The delegation of comprehensive
planning authority to local governments in Georgia is broad, how-
ever, since it is tied to the state's interest in protecting and pre-
serving "the natural resources, [the] environment, and [the] vital
areas of the state."224 Certain elements are required to appear in
local comprehensive plans, including plans for the protection of
natural and historic resources. 225 Under the rules of the Office of
Coordinated Planning in Georgia, local land use planning is re-
quired to strike a balance between the protection of vulnerable
natural and historic resources and respect for individual property
rights, a classic formulation of smart growth policy.226 Again, this
is a strong commitment to enabling localities to achieve smart
growth through local lawmaking.
In South Carolina, the state constitution authorizes the legis-
lature to provide for "[tihe structure and organization, powers, du-
ties, functions and responsibilities of the municipalities . . .by
general law."227 The Constitution also expressly abolishes Dillon's
Rule, providing that, " [t]he provisions of [the] Constitution and all
laws concerning local government shall be liberally construed in
their favor," and that any powers granted to local government by
the constitution and laws "shall include those fairly implied and
not prohibited by [the] Constitution."228 Local governments in
South Carolina derive their express zoning and planning powers
from the South Carolina Local Government Planning Comprehen-
sive Enabling Act. Adopted in 1994, the Act consolidates the local
planning and zoning statutes in a comprehensive law and recog-
nizes new planning and zoning powers. 229 The zoning and plan-
222. David W. Owens, Local Government Authority to Implement Smart Growth
Programs: Dillon's Rule, Legislative Reform, and the Current State of Affairs in North
Carolina, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 701 (2000) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-
340(a), 160A-381 (1999)).
223. Kirkland v. Johnson, 76 S.E.2d 396, 398 (Ga. 1953).
224. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-70-1 (2000).
225. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. r. 110-12-1-.04(5) (1997).
226. Id. r. 110-12-1-.04(5)(f)(1).
227. S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 9.
228. Id. § 17.
229. 1994 S.C. Acts 355.
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ning act also authorizes specific zoning techniques such as cluster
development, floating zones, and planned development dis-
tricts.230 However, the Act makes clear that any other planning
and zoning techniques may be used.
In Colorado, the Local Government Land Use Control Ena-
bling Act of 1974231 ("Land Use Enabling Act") and the Colorado
Land Use Act 232 provide local governments with broad authority
to adopt smart growth laws. 233 The Colorado Land Use Act was
enacted in part "to encourage uses of land and other natural re-
sources that are in accordance with their character and adaptabil-
ity [and] to conserve soil, water, and forest resources."234 To meet
these objectives, the Colorado legislature established the Colorado
Land Use Commission to develop a land use planning program
that "may include but need not be limited to an environmental
matrix."235 The Commission is required to recognize that "the de-
cision-making authority as to the character and use of land shall
be at the lowest level of government possible." 236 The purpose of
the Land Use Enabling Act is to achieve "planned and orderly de-
velopment within [the state]" and to maintain a balance between
"basic human needs" and "legitimate environmental concerns. ''237
In New York, the express authority delegated to local govern-
ments to adopt zoning regulations is contained in what is loosely
called the Zoning Enabling Act. 238 The New York statute is simi-
lar to those found in the majority of states, since most derived
their approaches from the standard zoning enabling act promul-
gated by a federal commission in the 1920s.239 The express words
230. S.C. CODE § 6-29-720 (C)(1), (2), (4) (2002).
231. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-20-101 to 29-20-107 (2001).
232. Id. §§ 24-65-101 to 24-65.1-502.
233. See id. §§ 29-20-101 to 29-20-105 (Local Government Land Use Enabling Act
of 1974); id. §§ 24-65-101 to 24-65-106 (Colorado Land Use Act).
234. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-16-102 (2001).
235. Id. § 29-65-104(1)(a).
236. Id. § 24-65-104(1)(b) (2001).
237. Id. § 29-20-102.
238. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW §§ 19-24 (McKinney); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §§ 7-700, 742
(McKinney); N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 261-285 (McKinney).
239. An advisory commission appointed by Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover
promulgated the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, and this model act served as
the basis for most of the state statutes enacted to delegate the authority to adopt
zoning regulations to local governments. See STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT
(U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE 1926), reprinted in 5 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOFF'S
THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING App. A (2001). New York's zoning enabling law is
a near verbatim replica of this model enabling act. Parallel provisions regarding the
authority of New York's municipalities to adopt zoning and other land use regulations
are contained in the Town, Village, and General City Laws. See N.Y. TOWN LAW §§
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of the enabling act empower town, village, and city legislatures to
regulate the height and size of buildings, the percentage of the lot
to be occupied, the size of yards, the density of population, and the
location and use of buildings. For these purposes, local legisla-
tures are empowered to divide the community into districts that
are best suited to carry out the purposes of the enabling act. These
purposes include lessening congestion, promoting the general wel-
fare, preventing overcrowding, avoiding undue concentrations of
population, and facilitating the provision of supportive infrastruc-
ture. These regulations, according to the enabling act, shall be de-
signed to encourage the most "appropriate use of the land
throughout [the] municipality."240 In a sweeping endorsement of
local innovation in the land use field, New York's highest court
upheld a village's use of floating zoning over a vigorous dissent
arguing that authority for the invention of such a technique was
singularly absent from the enabling act. 241 The majority, perhaps
speaking to inventive local officials such as those in Ramapo
nearly twenty years later, encouraged local creativity with these
words: "The village's zoning aim being clear, the choice of methods
to accomplish it lay with the [legislative] board." 242
Other state-delegated authority to control land use in New
York is contained in parallel provisions of the Town, Village, and
General City Laws that empower local legislatures to adopt subdi-
vision and site plan regulations and provide for local administra-
tive boards to review and approve applications to develop
subdivided land or individual sites.243 The state legislative pur-
pose for granting subdivision authority to local governments is to
provide for the future growth and development of the community,
the provision of adequate infrastructure, and the "comfort, conve-
nience, safety, health and welfare of its population. '244 Before lo-
cal administrative bodies approve subdivisions, they "shall
require that the land . . . be of such character that it can be used
safely for building purposes without danger to health or peril from
fire, flood, drainage or other menace to neighboring properties or
261-263 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 2001); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §§ 7-700, 7-702, 7-704
(McKinney 1996); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW §§ 20(24)-20(25) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
240. See N.Y. TOWN LAW § 263 (McKinney 1994); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-704 (Mc-
Kinney 1996).
241. Rodgers v. City of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731 (N.Y. 1951).
242. Rodgers, 96 N.E.2d at 734.
243. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 276; N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-728; N.Y. TOWN LAW § 32.
244. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276(1) (McKinney Supp. 2001); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-728(1)
(McKinney Supp. 2001); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 32(1) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
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to the public health, safety and welfare."245 It was this authority
that was relied on by the Ramapo court:
To this end, subdivision control purports to guide community
development in the directions outlined here, while at the same
time encouraging the provision of adequate facilities for the
housing, distribution, comfort and convenience of local re-
sidents. It reflects in essence, a legislative judgment that the
development of unimproved areas be accompanied by provision
of essential facilities. 24 6
The breadth of power delegated to local governments by these
New York statutes can also be inferred from those sections of state
law that authorize local governments to adopt comprehensive
plans, to which the law stated all local land use regulations must
conform. These provisions, loosely known as the Planning Ena-
bling Act, define a land use regulation as a "local law enacted by
the [municipality] for the regulation of any aspect of land use and
community resource protection and includes any zoning, subdivi-
sion, special use permit or site plan regulation or any other regu-
lation which prescribes the appropriate use of property or the
scale, location and intensity of development." 247
In New York, municipalities have been delegated direct au-
thority to protect the environment under the state's home rule
law. The home rule provisions of Article IX of the New York Con-
stitution and legislation passed pursuant to it give local govern-
ments broad home rule powers. 248  The state legislature
implemented Article IX with the enactment of the Municipal
Home Rule Law (MHRL), the provisions of which are to be "liber-
ally construed. ' 249 Under the MHRL, localities are given the au-
thority to adopt laws relating to their "property, affairs or
government,"250 to "[tihe protection and enhancement of [their]
physical and visual environment,"251 and to the matters delegated
245. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277(1) (McKinney Supp. 2001); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-730(1)
(McKinney Supp. 2001); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 33(1) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
246. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 298.
247. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 28-a (3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2001); N.Y. TOWN LAW §
272-a (2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2001); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-722 (2)(b) (McKinney
Supp. 2001).
248. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX.
249. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 51 (McKinney 1994).
250. Id. § 10(1)(i).
251. Id. § 10(1)(ii)(a)(11).
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to them under the statute of local governments. 252 The statute of
local governments delegates to municipalities the power "to adopt,
amend and repeal zoning regulations" and to "perform compre-
hensive or other planning work relating to its jurisdiction."253
State legislatures in a number of states have granted local
governments home rule authority. Grants of home rule power pro-
vide varying authority to municipalities to operate broadly regard-
ing local affairs, instead of having to rely on various express
grants of authority for particular purposes. The South Dakota
Constitution, for example, provides that "[a] chartered govern-
mental unit may exercise any legislative power or perform any
function not denied by its charter, the Constitution or the general
laws of the state .... Powers and functions of home rule units
shall be construed liberally."254
State legislatures can provide broad "police power" authority
to their municipalities. The California Constitution, for example,
provides that a city "may make and enforce within its limits all
local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in
conflict with general laws." 25 5 The Utah legislature conferred
upon cities the authority to enact all ordinances and regulations
"necessary and proper to provide for the safety and preserve the
health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace
and good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and [the] in-
habitants [thereof!, and for the protection of property in the
city."256 In interpreting this statute, the Utah Supreme Court has
discarded a strict application of Dillon's Rule, stating, "If there
were once valid policy reasons supporting the rule, we think they
have largely lost their force and that effective local self-govern-
ment, as an important constituent part of our system of govern-
ment, must have sufficient power to deal effectively with the
problems with which it must deal."25 7 In several other states, the
general grant of the police power authority to local governments
252. Id. § 10(1).
253. Id. §§ 10(6), (7) (McKinney 1994).
254. S.D. CONST. art. IX, § 2; see also ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 6 (stating that "a home
rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its govern-
ment and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection
of the public health, safety, morals and welfare").
255. CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 7.
256. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-84 (1999 & Supp. 2001).
257. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Utah 1980).
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has been construed by courts to convey power beyond that granted
by specific statutory acts. 258
What should be made of these state laws that respect local
prerogatives in land use regulation and smart growth? What are
the dangers and limitations of localism? Again, the Ramapo story
is instructive.
V. THE LOGIC OF LOCALISM-THE RAMAPO
INVENTION THAT FAILED
The local officials in Ramapo responsible for the town's growth
control laws knew they were vulnerable. If small groups of re-
sidents in discrete parts of town grew discontented with the
town's land use laws, they had the power to form their own vil-
lages, adopt their own land use laws, and abandon the carefully
sculpted town-wide approach. 259 At the time the growth control
law was adopted, there were six independent villages within the
town and their growth and zoning were carefully incorporated into
the town's proposals. 260 In 1967, the town board adopted another
invention, a local law that limited the creation of villages under
this expansive state law allowing village secession from towns. 261
This law provided that every petition for the incorporation of addi-
tional villages within town boundaries should comply with all the
requirements of the applicable provisions of the state's village in-
corporation law and "contain allegations that the proposed incor-
poration is in the overall public interest" of the proposed village,
258. See, e.g., Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1976) (allowing
rent-control initiative); Leavenworth Club Owners Ass'n v. Atchison, 492 P.2d 183
(Kan. 1971) (allowing ordinance restricting sale of liquor); City of Duluth v. Cerveny,
16 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. 1944) (allowing liquor seizure ordinance); Lehrhaupt v. Flynn,
356 A.2d 35 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976) (allowing financial disclosure ordinance); City of
Hobbs v. Biswell, 473 P.2d 917 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970) (allowing regulation of pawnbro-
kers); Krolick v. Lowery, 302 N.Y.S.2d 109 (App. Div. 1969) (upholding regulation
requiring blood tests from firemen); Adams v. City of New Kensington, 55 A.2d 392
(Pa. 1947) (allowing license fees for jukeboxes); City of Pasco v. Dixson, 503 P.2d 76
(Wash. 1972) (allowing ordinance that prohibited disturbing and indecent behavior in
public).
259. Village Law, Article II, allows territories containing 500 or more residents to
create their own villages. The process is begun by a petition by 20% of the residents
qualified to vote or by the owners of 50% or more of the assessed value of real property
in the area. This law contains only procedural requirements; no substantive findings
are required such as that the incorporation is in the best interest of the territory and
the town. The petition of incorporation requires simply "an allegation of the basis on
which the petition is signed." RAMAPO VILLAGE LAw § 2-202 (1)(b)(1).
260. These six villages were: Suffern, Spring Valley, Hillburn, Sloatsburg, New
Square, and Pomona.
261. RAMAPO, N.Y., LocAL LAW 3 (1967).
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the rest of the town, and any school or fire district affected by the
incorporation. 262
The constitutionality of this law was challenged, ten years
later, in Marcus v. Baron.263 The petitioners claimed that the law
was inconsistent with the state-adopted village incorporation
law. 264 The Supreme Court agreed and invalidated Ramapo's vil-
lage incorporation law, holding that the town's authority was pre-
empted by state law on the subject.265 The Appellate Division
reversed, reasoning that "[a] local law may cover the same subject
matter embraced in state legislation by supplementing the gen-
eral law with additional reasonable requirements." 266 This inter-
mediate court noted, "If local governments are to function
effectively in metropolitan areas, they must have sufficient size
and authority to plan, administer and provide significant financial
support for solutions to area-wide problems. ' 267 The New York
Court of Appeals reversed, finding nothing in state law to sustain
town authority to govern village secession: no express or implied
authority, no legislative intent, and no evidence of this authority
in the constitution or other municipal statute.268 The result was
the invalidation of the controlled secession law. Since the Marcus
v. Baron decision, another six villages have been formed. 269 In the
last two months of 2002, residents within another three areas in
the town initiated petitions to incorporate.270 As a result, there is
262. Id. § 45-3(B).
263. Marcus v. Baron, 442 N.E.2d 437 (N.Y. 1982).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Marcus v. Baron, 445 N.Y.S.2d 587 (App. Div. 1981) (citing Robin v. Inc. Vill.
of Hempstead, 30 N.Y.2d 347 (N.Y. 1972)).
267. Baron, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 595, 598. The Appellate Division relied in part on a
recent amendment of the Municipal Home Rule of New York giving local governments
the power to supersede the provisions of generally applicable state law. N.Y. MUN.
HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) (McKinney 2002).
268. Id. at 590 (no express or implied authority), 598 (no legislative intent), 597 (no
constitutional authority).
269. These include New Hempstead, Chestnut Ridge, Airmont, Montebello, Wesley
Hills, and Kasar.
270. THE JOURNAL NEWS, Nov. 26, 2002 at 3B. The proposed villages are Orchard
Ridge, Highview Heights, and Forshay Hills, with a population of 585 persons. In
addition, approximately 30% of the surface area of the town is located within the Pali-
sades Interstate Park, which cannot be built upon and which is governed by a state
agency, the Palisades Interstate Park Agency. William Gould, former chair of the
Ramapo Planning Board, in office in the late 1960s, noted in a letter dated Sept. 6,
2002, "[Slince zoning was not enforced in much of the town, multiple villages were
formed in the 1980s, each designed to control zoning the way its residents preferred
it. In summary, Ramapo has become a Balkanized mess, in terms of a master plan."
Letter from William Gould, Sept. 6, 2002 (on file with the author). In the author's
44http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol23/iss3/7
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today very little contiguous land left in Ramapo for the town's
comprehensive plan and inventive zoning controls to regulate.
VI. THE NEGATIVE LEGACY OF LOCALISM-
EXCLUSION
How area-wide or regional problems can be addressed by the unco-
ordinated workings of nearly 1,600 local governments in New
York is one of the continuing vexations of the Ramapo decision
and of its affirmation of local sovereignty and invention. Perhaps
the most visible and negative legacy of localism in New York, and
many states, is the exclusionary effect of local land use control:
the rejection of locally unwanted land uses, including affordable
housing, which is the subject of this section. While New York
courts have been moderately aggressive in prohibiting exclusion-
ary zoning, their efforts have been fundamentally frustrated by
the lack of state or regional definitions of housing needs. This is
ironic, since New York courts have imposed an obligation on mu-
nicipalities to consider regional housing needs in their zoning or-
dinances. The operative principle here is that, since the zoning
power is a delegation of the state's police power, it cannot be used
to exclude low- and moderate-income households, an important
segment of the state's population.
The landmark case of Berenson v. Town of New Castle271 and
an associated line of cases establish the legal rules used by courts
to decide whether municipal zoning unconstitutionally excludes
affordable types of housing.27 2 These cases establish standards
that urge localities to adopt inclusionary zoning provisions, while
opinion, much of this incorporation activity was fueled by land use issues other than
the build-out of the 18-year growth management strategy.
271. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y. 1975).
272. See, e.g., Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Vill. of Upper Brookville, 414 N.E.2d 680,
683-85 (N.Y. 1980) (Arguably adding a third factor to the Berenson test, holding that
if the ordinance was enacted with an exclusionary purpose it would fail constitutional
examination. The court found that the village ordinance passed all three prongs of the
test and upheld the five-acre lot zoning at issue); Allen v. Town of North Hempstead,
478 N.Y.S.2d 919, 922 (App. Div. 1984) (A durational residency requirement imposed
as a precondition to qualifying for residence in a Golden Age Residence District was
found to violate Berenson's standards and was therefore unconstitutional. The court
wrote that "[tihe durational residence requirement at bar has a more direct exclusion-
ary effect on nonresidents like plaintiffs than the almost total exclusion of multi-fam-
ily housing held to be unconstitutional by this court [in Berenson]").
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urging the state, in turn, to provide for regional and statewide
planning in these matters. 273
Having established a jurisprudential basis for inclusionary
zoning, the New York courts have gone no further. The state legis-
lature has failed to respond to the court of appeals' urging to cre-
ate standards to guide local efforts to include affordable types of
housing in their zoning regulations. As a result, affordable hous-
ing market regions have not been identified, regional needs have
not been calculated, and local fair share allocations have not been
made, nor can they be easily divined. In this standardless environ-
ment, those who challenge exclusionary zoning find it very diffi-
cult to prove that current zoning violates the Berenson tests. In
the absence of more specific guidance from the courts or the legis-
lature, local governments in New York have been slow to adopt
inclusionary zoning provisions.
VII. THE CONTINUING ENIGMA
In Golden v. Ramapo, the New York Court of Appeals, while up-
holding the town's growth management programs, called on the
state legislature to adopt a system of "[sitate-wide or regional con-
trol of [land use] planning" to "insure that interests broader than
that of the municipality underlie various land use policies."274
New York's highest court minced no words in 1972. It stated that
New York's zoning enabling legislation "is burdened by the largely
antiquated notion which deigns that the regulation of land use
and development is uniquely a function of local government ....
"275 Under this system of local control of land use, "questions of
broader public interest have commonly been ignored."276 The
court referenced criticisms of community autonomy finding that
273. "Zoning... is essentially a legislative act. Thus, it is quite anomalous that a
court should be required to perform the tasks of a regional planner. To that end, we
look to the [1]egislature to make appropriate changes in order to foster the develop-
ment of programs designed to achieve sound regional planning." Berenson, 341 N.E.2d
at 243. This echoes Ramapo: "Of course, these problems (of growth) cannot be solved
by Ramapo or any single municipality, but depend upon the accommodation of widely
disparate interests for their ultimate resolution. To that end, [sitate-wide or regional
control of planning would insure that interests broader than that of the municipality
underlie various land use policies." Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 300 (1972). For further
discussion about affordable housing and the legacy of Ramapo, see Stuart R. Sham-
berg & Adam L. Wekstein's The Local and Regional Need for Housing and the
Ramapo Plan, 35 URBAN LAW. 165 (2003).
274. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 300.
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local land use control suffers from "pronounced insularism" 277 and
produces "distortions in metropolitan growth patterns."278  It
noted that local control had the effect of "crippling efforts toward
regional and State-wide problem solving, be it pollution, decent
housing, or public transportation. '279
In 1972 when Ramapo was decided, there was some reason to
believe that the state legislature was listening. In the early 1970s,
the legislature enacted the Adirondack Park Agency Act (the APA
Act), preempting local land use authority over significant land use
matters throughout an immense geographical region, encompass-
ing 20 percent of the state's land area and 20 percent of its coun-
ties.280 Under the Act, the Adirondack Park Agency (APA) was
given jurisdiction to review and approve projects with definable
regional impacts. 28 1 The APA also has jurisdiction to review and
approve other regional projects in any area not governed by an
approved and validly adopted local land use program. 2 2
The APA Act was attacked in 1977 as an unconstitutional in-
terference with the authority of local government to zone and con-
trol land use.28 3 The court of appeals framed the issue before it in
terms of whether the "future of a cherished regional park is a mat-
ter of state concern. '28 4 If so identified, the matter would fall into
the area reserved to the state by the state constitution and the
Statute of Local Governments. 285 The court of appeals held that
the future of the regional park is a matter of state concern and
that, therefore, the APA Act does not violate the home rule provi-
sions of the state constitution reserving control over local matters
to local governments. 28 6 It reasoned that to use home rule princi-
ples to allow local control of land use in the Adirondack Park re-
gion would mean that local interests would be promoted at the




280. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 801-819 (McKinney 2002). See generally William H. Kissel,
The Adirondack Park: Two Decades of Innovative Land Use Planning, 1992
N.Y.S.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP. L. SEC. NEWSL. 20, at 39.
281. N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 808-810 (McKinney 2002).
282. Id. § 809.
283. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 362 N.E.2d 581 (N.Y. 1977).
284. Id. at 582.
285. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 3; see also N.Y. STAT. OF Loc. Gov. § 11(4) (McKin-
ney 2002).
286. Wambat, 362 N.E.2d at 583.
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Of course, the Agency Act prevents localities within the
Adirondack Park from freely exercising their zoning and planning
powers. That indeed is its purpose and effect, not because the mo-
tive is to impair home rule but because the motive is to serve a
supervening state concern transcending local interests. 28 7
Stiff resistance to further efforts at regionalism or local pre-
emption set in during the early 1970s. Among the reasons that
explain subsequent aversion to change in New York is the bitter
recollection of two far-reaching proposals that were buried in an
avalanche of public opposition. 288 The first was Senate Bill 9028
(S. 9028), the Land Use and Development Law, 28 9 proposed in
1970; the second was the Urban Development Corporation's 1972
proposal to construct low- and moderate-income housing in sev-
eral affluent suburban communities in Westchester County.
Senate Bill 9028 called for a statewide comprehensive land
use plan, regional plans, and county plans, all compatible and con-
sistent with one another. 290 County plans were to direct develop-
ment into high-density areas and away from agricultural and
rural lands. 291 Local governments were to exercise their land use
authority in conformance with the county plans. 292 By these
means, an integrated statewide planning system was to be created
that coordinated the land use initiatives of each level of govern-
ment. The reaction to S. 9028 was severe. Not only did the bill fail
to reach the full senate, 29 3 but the state agency that proposed it
was disbanded by the legislature shortly thereafter.2 94 Two years
later, the state Urban Development Corporation (UDC) was
stripped of its zoning override powers after pursuing its proposal
to build subsidized housing in nine Westchester villages and
towns.295
287. Id. at 584.
288. See JOHN R. NOLON, WELL GROUNDED: USING LOCAL LAND USE AUTHORITY TO
ACHIEVE SMART GROWTH, 3 E.L.I. (2001).
289. S. 9028, 193d Ann. Legis. Sess. (1970).
290. S. 9028, §§ 3-106(2), 3-104, 4-101, & 4-102(1)(c).
291. Id. § 3-301.
292. Id. § 3-106(2).
293. S. 9028 died in committee. See 1970 N.Y. Legis. Rec. & Index S.677.
294. 1971 CONSOL. LAW § 11 (eliminating the New York Office of Planning
Coordination).
295. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6265(5) (signed into law on June 5, 1973) (McKinney
1979) The bill prevented the UDC from undertaking a residential development in a
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VIII. GRASSROOTS REGIONALISM-COHERENCE
THROUGH NETWORKS
It was not until 1991 that another regionalist proposal passed the
state legislature. In that year, the legislature created the Hudson
River Greenway Communities Council. 296 The legislation affects
both sides of the Hudson River extending from north of Albany to
New York City, including nearly 250 municipalities in twelve
counties. In the Adirondacks example, a regional plan was
adopted by the legislature and its implementation entrusted to an
agency with land use authority.297 Local land use authority was
significantly affected in the interests of achieving carefully articu-
lated state objectives. In stark contrast, the Hudson River Green-
way Communities Council is a regional state agency without any
authority to override local land use prerogatives. 298 Instead, a re-
gional greenway compact, or plan, is expected to emerge through
the collaboration of the council and participating municipalities in
its twelve-county jurisdiction. Subregional plans are to be devel-
oped collaboratively as well.299 Localities are under no obligation
to join the compact. 300 Their failure to participate makes them
ineligible for a variety of incentives, however. These include tech-
nical assistance and direct grants for planning and programs from
the Greenway, bonus points in applying for discretionary grants
from other state agencies, and indemnity from liability should the
participating community be sued for complying with a compact
provision.301 The Greenway, as a state agency, is also obligated to
negotiate on behalf of participating communities with other state
agencies when those localities believe that a proposed state
agency project or program does not comply with their Greenway
296. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 44-0101 to 44-0201 (McKinney 2002).
297. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 800-820 (McKinney 2002).
298. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 44-0107 (McKinney 2002).
299. Id. § 44-0119(3): "If the local officials in any [subregion] fail to produce a re-
gional plan for their district or submit such plan which the council cannot approve,
the council may prepare or cause to be prepared a district plan which cities, towns
and villages in such district may voluntarily adopt by local law to become participat-
ing communities."
300. See id. § 44-0119, "The council shall guide and support a cooperative planning
process to establish a voluntary regional compact amongst the counties, cities, towns
and villages of the greenway to further the recommended criteria of natural and cul-
tural resource protection, regional planning, economic development, public access and
heritage education .... .
301. Id. § 44-0119 (9).
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compact objectives. 3 2 In drafting the legislation, attempts were
made to give the Greenway the power to review and shape local
development decisions to ensure that regional concerns are prop-
erly reflected. That provision did not survive final drafting. In the
end, the Greenway Council was given no legal authority to achieve
the ends of the legislation and local land use control is affected
only through voluntary actions of the constituent municipali-
ties.30 3
The Hudson River Greenway Communities Council initiative
exhibits a number of distinct characteristics. These include the
fact that it:
* espouses the importance of regionalism and municipal
interdependence;
* creates a structure for regional planning-from the bottom
up;
" is voluntary and does not alienate local officials by threat-
ening their independence;
* offers a variety of incentives such as planning and program
funding, immunity from liability, and a priority for secur-
ing discretionary state grants;
" provides technical assistance and guides local innovations;
" engages county governments to develop adjunct regulations
desired by some of the communities, 30 4 and
* encourages state agencies to conform their plans to those of
local communities fully participating with the Greenway.
A hierarchical nesting of levels of government and regulation
is achieved by this legislative approach delivered in a politically
sensitive manner. It, conceptually, achieves an integration of lo-
cal, county, and state agency activity of the type envisioned in a
more direct manner by S. 9028305 and the authors of The Quiet
Revolution.30 6 This is the signature approach in New York: en-
courage local governments to behave in productive ways, give
them the tools to do so, provide incentives, and let them choose
freely their own strategic path.
302. Dover joined the Greenway for the purpose of obtaining the Greenway's help,
as a state agency, in getting the state Department of Environmental Conservation to
work with, rather than against it, in aquifer protection. See supra notes 179-81.
303. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 44-0107 (McKinney 2002).
304. See supra note 139 and accompanying text regarding the use of Greenway
Connections by the Town of Hyde Park.
305. See supra notes 289-93 and accompanying text.
306. See BOSSELMAN & CALIHES, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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The Greenway approach, in fact, builds on a long history of
encouraging intermunicipal cooperation in New York. Since 1960,
state statutes have authorized local governments to enter into
compacts to design compatible land use plans and enact compati-
ble land use regulations with the enactment of Article 5-G of the
General Municipal Law.3 0 7 The provisions of these 1960 amend-
ments to the General Municipal Law were broad enough to allow
municipalities to cooperate regarding land use planning, regula-
tion, and administration. Although few communities used the
amendments' authority for that purpose, the state legislature in
the early 1990s thought that it was necessary to make this in-
termunicipal land use authority more explicit. 308 In 1992, the leg-
islature enacted additional legislation to further encourage
intergovernmental cooperation concerning comprehensive plan-
ning and land use regulation. 30 9 These statutes made it clear that
local governments have the authority to create intermunicipal
planning boards, zoning boards of appeals, comprehensive plans,
land use regulations, intermunicipal overlay districts, and pro-
grams for land use administration and enforcement.
Further improvements followed in 1993 when the state legis-
lature enabled county governments to assist constituent localities
in land use matters.310 These amendments allow cities, towns,
and villages to enter into intermunicipal agreements with coun-
ties to receive professional planning services from county plan-
ning agencies. In this way, municipalities lacking the financial
and technical resources to engage in professional planning activi-
ties can receive assistance from county planning agencies to carry
out their land use planning and regulatory functions. Pursuant to
these amendments, a county planning agency can act in an advi-
307. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-m. How these techniques can be used inter-
municipally to achieve broader conservation and economic development objectives is
discussed in John R. Nolon, Grassroots Regionalism Through Intermunicipal Land
Use Compacts, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1011 (1999). For a sober reflection as to how
aggressively municipalities might use their authority to collaborate across bounda-
ries, see FREILICH, supra note 4 at 3. ("Local governments have been particularly una-
ble to deal effectively with the problems that urban sprawl created. In large part, this
is a product of a system that allows each community to attempt to solve its own
problems without regard to the general needs and wants of the region of which the
community is a part.").
308. See Legislative Commission on Rural Resources, Memorandum, May 27, 1992,
at 1.
309. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g (McKinney 2002); N.Y. TowN LAW § 284 (Mc-
Kinney 2002); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741 (McKinney 2002).
310. The 1993 amendments modified N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW. §§ 119-u and 239-d, as
well as N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g, TowN LAW § 284 and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741.
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sory capacity, assist in the preparation of a comprehensive plan,
assist in the preparation of land use regulations, and participate
in the formation of individual or joint administrative bodies.
These state laws allow localities to confront the serious
problems caused by their own parochialism. The principal limit to
the reach of local land use control is jurisdictional: this authority
ends at the municipal border. As a matter of law and practice, lo-
cal zoning and comprehensive planning are introspective in na-
ture, operating within "our" community for the benefit of "our"
citizens. As a result, this power has not been used on a regular
basis as the legal vehicle for protecting intermunicipal environ-
mental resources, harnessing the influences of regional markets,
or influencing the land use decisions of municipal neighborhoods
that have certain external impacts. 311 Effective control over these
intermunicipal, or regional, matters depends on the ability of local
governments to plan and act in concert with one another. Over
time, the need to exercise some extraterritorial control has in-
creased and questions are now being asked about how neighboring
localities can protect "our" watershed or stimulate "our" economic
future. Another limitation of exercising land use authority in iso-
lation is that the municipal scale of operation may be less than
optimal. It may, in some cases, be insufficient for the tasks needed
to be undertaken. By joining with nearby communities with simi-
lar land use challenges, municipalities may share the cost of com-
prehensive plan preparation and of drafting zoning, wetlands, and
floodplain laws; aquifer protection, watershed enhancement, and
corridor development plans; and historic preservation, cultural re-
source protection, erosion control, and visual buffering programs.
They may achieve operational efficiencies as well through the for-
311. The impotence experienced when one municipality objects to the external im-
pacts of another's land use decision is evident in Bedford v. Mount Kisco, 306 N.E.2d
155 (N.Y. 1973). There, the Village of Mount Kisco rezoned a 7.68-acre parcel from
single-family residential to multifamily. The property was isolated from the village,
but bounded on three sides by the Town of Bedford by land exclusively zoned for sin-
gle-family residential uses, and accessible only by Bedford roads. The town challenged
the rezoning of land based on the negative impacts it would suffer and the failure of
the village to take those impacts into consideration in its rezoning decision. The court
of appeals upheld the rezoning pointing to findings made by the village board indicat-
ing that the rezoning complied with village comprehensive planning objectives. Noth-
ing in the opinion indicates that the village considered, measured, or was influenced
by the alleged negative impacts on the town. The court noted that "the [village] Board
of Trustees considered the welfare and economic stability of Mount Kisco as its first
concern .... Bedford understandably differed from the conclusion reached, but that
difference must be regarded as the necessary result of conflicting zoning policies that
are confronted at the edge of every municipality" Id. at 189 (emphasis added).
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mation of joint planning, zoning, historic preservation, or conser-
vation advisory boards, and by entering into compacts to share the
cost of enforcing regulations and monitoring compliance.
Local leaders have learned, for example, that economic devel-
opment activities in one community cannot reverse negative
trends in the larger economic market area. Parallel action among
localities in the entire market area may be required to achieve any
noticeable effect. One community cannot create enough supply to
meet the regional demand for affordable housing. Efforts in one
community to protect natural resource areas that are shared with
adjacent municipalities cannot succeed without compatible efforts
in all the communities with land use jurisdiction affecting the re-
source. Economic development, housing demand, and resource
protection are but three examples of issues that require joint ac-
tion to be effective.
Given this understanding and strategic assistance, local lead-
ers will act effectively to form intermunicipal land use alliances.
Within the jurisdiction of the Hudson River Greenway Communi-
ties Council, for example, eight intermunicipal land use councils
have been formed within the past few years.3 1 2 These councils
have developed as result of New York's liberal intermunicipal co-
operation law, a region-wide leadership training program that em-
phasizes the practical benefits of such councils, 313 and the
emergence of a variety of problems incapable of local solution: eu-
trophication of water bodies, pollution of drinking water aquifers
and reservoirs, strip development along highways, destruction of
scenic viewsheds, and the deterioration of shared wetland areas.
Working together in these councils by itself has led local leaders to
the gradual realization that these issues can best be addressed by
coordinated efforts. 314
At the November Ramapo Conference, the mayor of Haver-
straw discussed his involvement in the formation of the Rockland
312. See Land Use Law Center Pace University School of Law, A Report from the
Intermunicipal Land Use Councils in the Hudson River Region, sponsored and distrib-
uted by the Hudson River Valley Greenway Communities Council (July 2002) (on file
with the author).
313. See infra note 314 and text.
314. This observation is not new. As early as 1971 studies of intergovernmental
councils documented that voluntary regional networks themselves sharpen local lead-
ers' focus on intermunicipal independence and the need for regional solutions. See
MELVIN B. MOGULOF, GOVERNNG METROPOLITAN AREAS: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF COUN-
CILS OF GOVERNMENTS AND THE FEDERAL ROLE 74 (The Urban Institute 1971).
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Riverfront Communities Council. 315 This council was organized
between May 2001, when leaders from the eleven municipalities
that share land use jurisdiction over the viewshed and watershed
of the Hudson River in Rockland County entered a four-day train-
ing program,3 16 and January 2002, when the council was officially
created following the adoption of supporting resolutions by the
legislative bodies of all eleven communities. Between these two
dates, community leaders from Rockland's riverfront communities
were encouraged by a state grant,3 17 technical assistance,31s and
their mutual needs and interests.
The Rockland Riverfront Communities Council (RRCC) com-
prises the Towns of Clarkstown, Haverstraw, Orangetown and
Stony Point; the Villages of Grand View, Haverstraw, Nyack,
Piermont, South Nyack, Upper Nyack, and West Haverstraw; the
Palisades Interstate Park Commission; and the County of Rock-
land. The council is organized under an inter-municipal agree-
ment and is charged with exploring ways to obtain funding and
carry out programs for conservation, development, and other land
use and water-related activities along the Hudson River. Its goals
are to protect, enhance, and utilize the unique assets of the Hud-
son River; to enhance and promote historic preservation; to edu-
cate the public on environmental issues; to provide public access
to the Hudson River where possible; to preserve and protect natu-
ral, historic, and cultural resources; and to encourage economic
development that is sustainable.
315. Letter from Mayor Francis J. Wassmer presented at November Ramapo
Conference.
316. Community leaders from each Rockland river town and village attended the
Greenway Community Leadership Alliance Training Program in the spring of 2001.
Each representative received a $1,500 scholarship from the Hudson River Valley
Greenway Communities Council to cover the costs of the program, which teaches local
leaders how to use land use law, conflict resolution, and community decision-making
techniques to accomplish sustainable community development. This round of training
was one of twelve conducted by the Land Use Law Center that has graduated over
400 local leaders from Hudson River communities. Three rounds of training have
been sponsored by the Greenway.
317. Council leaders credit the formation of their group in part to a $150,000 Qual-
ity Communities grant from the New York State Department of State. Rockland
County, Westchester County, and Pace University Land Use Law Center received the
grant to encourage inter-municipal partnerships among riverfront communities by
funding collaborative activities in the land use area.
318. Town and village representatives attended a series of workshops, facilitated
by the Land Use Law Center and staffed by the Rockland County Planning Depart-
ment, at which they discussed various waterfront projects and met with state and
nongovernmental organizations to discuss the competitive advantages of forming a
sub-regional land use council.
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The council has a five-member executive committee and is
governed by delegates and their alternates selected by the legisla-
tive bodies of the participating communities. Communities may
withdraw from the council at any time, upon sixty-day written no-
tice.319
The incentive funding provided to the Rockland Riverfront
Communities Council was part of an experimental funding pro-
gram initiated by the State of New York. The Department of
State, which administers the program, made it clear that localities
were more likely to receive grants if they joined with neighboring
communities in developing smart growth strategies for demon-
stration grant funds. Over 180 applications were received, totaling
over $17 million in requests, and over 80 percent of the applica-
tions were intermunicipal in nature. 320  This type of in-
termunicipal cooperation is unprecedented in New York and is
attributed largely to the state's decision to make funding available
on a priority basis to intermunicipal smart growth projects.
IX. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Town of Ramapo blazed a bright trail of invention in the late
1960s. The Ramapo court sustained the town's power to do so and,
for thirty years, local governments have been ever bolder in devel-
oping smart growth solutions to their unique land use problems.
They are adopting novel local environmental laws, transferring
development rights from one part of town to another and from one
community to another, providing zoning incentives to developers,
creating overlay zones to protect watersheds and provide for tradi-
tional neighborhood development, adopting performance-based
zoning ordinances, floating bonds to acquire funds for the
purchase of development rights, and creating a number of impres-
sive intermunicipal land use councils to achieve sub-regional co-
herence. This trend toward local invention owes much to the Town
of Ramapo, including its local officials, Professor Robert H.
Freilich, and the New York Court of Appeals.
While criticizing local control and calling for the legislature to
accommodate regional needs in some fashion, the Ramapo court
empowered local governments, in the absence of a better ap-
proach, to deal aggressively with a number of land use issues that
319. Organizational documents are on file with the author.
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have become all the more pressing since its decision in 1972. De-
spite much criticism of localism, effective strategies to preempt or
direct local land use decisions have been slow to materialize: fif-
teen years of regulatory takings cases have not defined clearly the
constitutional limits of local regulatory authority, New Jersey's
aggressive, state-mandated fair share housing policy has been em-
ulated timidly in just a few states, regional and statewide land use
planning has not emerged in most states to effectively constrain or
guide local land use planning, and a series of reform movements
(growth management, sustainable development, and smart
growth) have failed to dictate the outcomes of local land use dis-
putes in most states.
The top-down reform, command-and-control approach suffers
its own shortcomings. State governments experience political and
practical inhibitions that frustrate their preemption of local au-
thority, and there are judicial doubts about the existence of fed-
eral jurisdiction to preempt local land use authority.3 21 Further,
federal or state enforcement of land use standards at the local
level where conditions are highly diverse is prohibitively costly
and of doubtful efficacy. Federal and state lawmakers and agency
personnel have neither the time, resources, nor information to
micromanage the development of individual parcels, establish
plans and visions for individual neighbors and communities, or to
monitor water, soil, and other conditions in all places over time.
Local citizens, their lawmakers, and land use agencies have the
most immediate stake in these matters and have a legitimate role
to play in protecting their quality of life. Local officials in Dover,
New York, for example, used Ramapo-like inventions to take con-
trol away from a state agency whose policies were not synchro-
nized with critical local environmental interests.322
321. Early attempts by the EPA to reduce air pollution by intervening in local de-
velopment matters were recognized as a threat to the power of the states to control
land use, secured by the Tenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. X. Such concerns led
to 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, which stated that "[niothing in this Act
constitutes an infringement on the existing authority of counties and cities to plan or
control land use, and nothing in this Act provides or transfers authority over such
land use." 42 U.S.C. § 7431 (1994). More recently, the efforts of the Army Corps of
Engineers to prevent the construction of a landfill by a consortium of municipalities in
the Chicago area were struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Solid Waste Agency
of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, the Court held that the
Army Corps lacked jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act to regulate development in
intrastate, nonnavigable waters solely on the basis of the presence of migratory birds.
531 U.S. 159, 171 (2001).
322. See supra notes 179 & 180.
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Although incremental strategies such as those at play in New
York have not been popular with regional activists and many
scholars, 323 there is evidence of new curiosity among academics
and practitioners about the effectiveness of voluntary networks as
means of achieving regional coherence. There is considerable in-
terest in other regions in this grassroots approach. Envision Utah,
for example, is a network of interest groups working at the re-
gional level along a 100-mile corridor running north and south of
Salt Lake City. It comprises eighty-eight local governments and
80 percent of the state's population. Assisted by state grants, En-
vision Utah is a nongovernmental alliance with significant private
funding. Envision Utah conducted extensive opinion surveys of re-
sidents who demonstrated a strong preference for walkable,
transit-oriented development, infill strategies, and redevelopment
of urbanized portions of the region. Based on grassroots-derived
implementation strategies, the state legislature passed the Qual-
ity Growth Act in 1999, established a commission, and charged it
with assisting local governments with grants and technical assis-
tance. The commission is also responsible for coordinating the
work of six state agencies. Envision Utah developed a toolbox of
techniques that can be used by local governments and in-
termunicipal councils to create their own visions and implement
the regional vision.324
Peter Calthorpe and William Fulton conclude that the Envi-
sion Utah experience "demonstrates that a regional plan is often
more a process than a set of policies or a map. It is research, dis-
covery, and education combined. The process itself can fundamen-
tally reframe the issues of growth and community and create a
new vision of the region's economic and environmental future."325
Robert Fishman observes that "American planning today is most
effective and comprehensive precisely when it eschews all-embrac-
323. See David E. Booher & Judith E. Innes, Network Power in Collaborative Plan-
ning, 21 J. PLANNING EDUC. & RES. 221, 225 (2002): "While new kinds of collaboration
have emerged in the private sector... , this arena has lagged behind in the public
sector in developing the potential of networked relationships. Moreover, there re-
mains much less scholarly documentation or analysis of these efforts that there is of
business management."
324. See http://www.envisionutah.org; see also Steve Osborne, Utah Has a Change
of Heart: Regional Planning Finds an Unexpected Home, APA PLANNING MAG., at 20-
22 (May 2001).
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ing powers and works instead within the limits of pluralistic sys-
tems ... that actually define America-built environments."326
The Ramapo story, its emanations, and the recent national
experience suggest a number of practical recommendations for the
adjustment of the typical state-created land use control system.
These recommendations fall short of a systemic fix that will lead
to the provision of affordable housing for all in need, the proper
balance of land uses, and the appropriate location of regionally
significant projects. They have more modest aspirations, drawing
only on the story told in the preceding pages and suggesting a uni-
fying strategic path:
First, Allow Annexation: In Warwick, the town and village af-
ter a few hostile encounters, learned how to cooperate and mutu-
ally benefit from village annexation of town land. New York law
provides for adjudication of whether annexation is in the overall
best interests of those involved. The law should be amended to
permit and provide for mediation of proposed annexations as an
organized means of conducting the public debate over the matter,
and of identifying and aligning the multiple interests associated
with the task.3 27
Second, Discourage Municipal Secession: Even with New
York's aggressive intermunicipal cooperation legislation, one
doubts that Ramapo can effectively be put back together again.
With twelve, perhaps soon to be fifteen, villages within the town,
land use controls are chaotically divided among a dizzying number
of jurisdictions, each governing a relatively small territory. The
state village incorporation law should be amended to require a
finding that secession is in the overall public interest, or allow a
court to block secession when opponents of incorporation can show
that the public interest is not served. The factors to be considered
in determining whether the public interest is met could include
the cost-effectiveness of the proposed government,3 28 the size of
the proposed territory and its population, the unique circum-
stances that require its incorporation, identification of the public
326. Robert Fishman, The Death and Life of American Regional Planning, in RE-
FLECTIONS ON REGIONALISM 107, 119 (Bruce Katz ed., 2000).
327. This could be part of a regional mediation mechanism set up to resolve a vari-
ety of intermunicipal land use issues. Such devices are beginning to appear in state
legislation. Mediation of regional planning disputes is provided for under state law in
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Minnesota, Oregon, and Tennessee.
328. See supra note 269 (discussing attempts to form three new villages in
Ramapo, including Forshay Hills, proposed population 585).
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interests served by incorporation, and the negative impact on the
town within which the new village would be formed. Municipal
formation can have regional consequences and is another matter
that can be handled well by referral to a regional mediation mech-
anism established by state law.
Third, Empower Local Governments to Invent: State law
should allow local governments ample authority to solve their own
smart growth problems. Consider the stories of Dover and Sleepy
Hollow and how keenly felt local interests were met through effec-
tive local action.329 Envision Utah understands the need to equip
local governments with effective tools and urge them to use these
tools in concert with their neighboring jurisdictions. Ramapo and
Warwick, illustrate how local officials can combine techniques to
create locally appropriate land use strategies. In a state like New
York, with nearly 1,600 local governments flung across a diverse
landscape, the need for unique local solutions is patent. Such di-
versity exists as well in smaller states, like Connecticut, with 169
jurisdictions whose needs vary from fighting extreme poverty and
urban congestion to protecting largely unsettled and environmen-
tally fragile territories.
Fourth, Encourage Localities to Cooperate: New York's forty-
year commitment to intermunicipal cooperation is a model for
other states to follow. The emerging interest in, and the success of,
voluntary regional and subregional networks, such as Envision
Utah, the Rockland Riverfront Communities Council, and seven
other intermunicipal land use councils in the Hudson River Valley
region, demonstrate the good use to which intermunicipal agree-
ments can be put: compatible land use plans and regulations, joint
boards, shared enforcement officers, watershed protection re-
gimes, and strategies to meet regional housing needs.
Fifth, Provide Data and Information: The basic building
blocks of local smart growth plans are the identification of critical
environmental areas and appropriate growth districts. 330 This is
the foundation on which implementation strategies must be
329. At the Local Environmental Law symposium held in April 2002 by the Land
Use Law Center on the advent of local environmental law, scholars considered the
possibility that, in an integrated federal system, local governments could fill signifi-
cant gaps in existing federal environmental law. Governments could gain some con-
trol, for example, of water pollution caused by nonpoint source pollution, and air
pollution caused by increased vehicle miles traveled. See NEW GROUND, THE ADVENT
OF LocAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (John R. Nolon ed. ELI, 2002).
330. See John R. Nolon, Local Land Use Controls That Achieve Smart Growth, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 11025 (2001).
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based. Area designation must precede the adoption of local envi-
ronmental regulations and the targeting of strategies to support
growth and development. The costs of collecting and evaluating
the data needed to identify conservation and development areas
are considerably higher if done by 1,600 local governments sepa-
rately. One of the reasons that local comprehensive plans are not
done, or are not updated, is the high cost of information gathering.
These costs can be much lower, data availability assured, and the
regional needs identified, if information is gathered, evaluated,
and disseminated by a coordinated effort among regional, state,
and federal agencies. Consider the dilemma of the Berenson af-
fordable housing cases: How can communities zone for sufficient
affordable housing, of the proper type and costs, without having
some idea of their roughly proportionate share of the regional
need? Local governments establishing intermunicipal programs to
protect watershed resources have the same difficulty: How should
the watershed area be delineated? What are its exact boundaries?
What are the critical environmental conditions within that area?
Where are they located?
Sixth, Provide Training and Technical Assistance: The forma-
tion of eight intermunicipal councils in the Hudson River region,
and the success of Dover, Hyde Park, Sleepy Hollow, and Warwick
were all assisted, if not catalyzed, by training provided to key local
leaders, and technical assistance provided by outside entities fo-
cused on issues of immediate concern. States should establish ef-
fective educational and technical assistance programs to ensure
that local policymakers and planners know about, and how to use,
the land use authority they have been delegated. Technical assis-
tance should include educational materials such as practical
guidebooks, best practice manuals, and model laws and ordi-
nances, as well as training on land use strategies and effective
community problem solving.
Seventh, Provide Start-Up Grants: Warwick, Hyde Park, Do-
ver, Sleepy Hollow, and the Rockland Riverfront Communities
Council all received cash from state agencies including the Hud-
son River Greenway Communities Council, the Department of
Transportation, the Quality Communities Program of the Depart-
ment of State, and a variety of nongovernmental agencies, to jump
start their programs. These monies allowed the communities to
hire program and technical staff, conduct studies, hire technical
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advisers, and formulate plans that were essential to their pro-
gress. Unfortunately, the state does not have a discrete program
for this purpose; the funds were obtained from a variety of special
purpose or intermittent sources. As a result, there is no sustained
effort to induce local governments to become involved in smart
growth strategies and intermunicipal land use councils. The re-
markable success of the few governments benefited by start-up
grants strongly argues for the creation of a permanent and ade-
quate program by the states.
Eighth, Target Funds for Smart Growth Districts: State and
federal discretionary funding for development and conservation
projects should be made available, on a priority basis, to local gov-
ernments that adopt smart growth policies, designate growth and
conservation areas, and need funding to implement their strate-
gies. State and federal agencies can provide powerful incentives
for local, intermunicipal, and regional smart growth planning and
implementation. 331 To do this, these agencies need to make it
clear that infrastructure funding will be spent in designated
growth areas and that open space acquisition funds will be allo-
cated to designated areas that contain significant natural re-
sources or fertile agricultural lands. Such funds can be used, for
example, to purchase the development rights of critical environ-
mental lands, to cover the costs of local environmental enforce-
ment, to pay for needed infrastructure in growth districts, or to
pay for programs of intermunicipal partnerships formed to pro-
mote affordable housing, economic development, or to protect wa-
tersheds, biodiversity, or coastal regions. An even higher priority
in the distribution of state and federal program funds should be
given to those local governments that have entered into in-
termunicipal land use compacts or are working with their county
or regional agencies on area-wide smart growth strategies.
Ninth, Encourage Mediation: Mediation set the stage for a
dramatic intermunicipal smart growth program in Warwick. It
was used in the final stages of drafting Hyde Park's performance
331. This is the aim of Maryland's Smart Growth Program. See MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-7B-01 (1995 & Supp. 2000) (encouraging local smart growth
strategies by concentrating state infrastructure and development project funding in
"priority funding areas" to ensure that growth occurs in and around existing and care-
fully planned growth areas. This is balanced by the Rural Legacy Program, MD. CODE
ANN. NAT. RES. § 5-9A-01 (2000), which directs other state resources to protect agri-
cultural, forest, and natural resource lands).
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zoning ordinance to incorporate the interests of affected landown-
ers and secure their support. According to a study by the Consen-
sus Building Institute and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy,
the participants in mediated land use disputes throughout the
United States report an 84 percent satisfaction rate with their ex-
perience. 332 States have established mediation mechanisms for
special types of disputes, for resolving regional planning issues, to
assist with intermunicipal and intergovernmental watershed
planning efforts, and to address land use disputes between private
individuals and government bodies.333 This trend should continue
and mediation mechanisms be made available to resolve more pro-
ductively the issues raised by secession, annexation, in-
termunicipal impacts of local land use actions, regional impact
projects, and other land use disputes.
Tenth, Work Toward an Integrated and Intentional Policy:
Perhaps the central lesson learned from the Ramapo, and post-
Ramapo, experiences discussed in this article is that there is a
need for integrating the functions of various levels of government
aimed at managing growth and conserving environmental assets.
Each level of government has a major contribution to make in in-
suring the proper use and conservation of the land, and in adopt-
ing and enforcing laws that limit the enjoyment of private
property. All levels of government have legitimate interests in the
proper location of jobs, the adequacy of affordable housing, and
the protection of air, water, and other natural resources. No level
of government has all the competence, authority, and resources
needed to solve modern environmental and development problems
on its own.
Our legal system has evolved piecemeal. Separate and unco-
ordinated regimes at the federal, state, and local levels have been
created. The tensions among them abound and beg for mediation.
The inefficiencies apparent in the current patchwork quilt of regu-
latory influences are being observed where people live, at the local
level, and are being responded to by the adoption of an impressive,
if not yet pervasive, body of local law and practice.
As they set out to implement these modest recommendations,
states can intentionally work to reduce the fragmentation of ef-
forts and to experiment with integration strategies. The most ef-
332. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., MEDIATING LAND USE DISPUTES: PROS AND CONS
17 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 2000).
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fective method of responding to the complex and rapid changes
caused by the nation's sprawling development pattern is to create
a coordinated and integrated response. This requires, initially, a
commitment to cooperation and to learning how to assign to each
level of government its most appropriate role.
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